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THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE
TO PROTECTION
RICHARD A. GIVENS4
TJHE United States has sought for several years to encourage its trade
with other free nations as a means of strengthening the economy of
the free world, promoting cooperation with our friends abroad, and re-
placing in part the need for direct foreign aid.1 But at the same time,
we have also sought the conflicting goal of protecting domestic industries
from foreign competition. Such protection has been championed for a va-
riety of reasons, among which are:
1. To prevent injury to domestic industries and hardship to domestic
employees in specific industries and localities;
2
2. To offset the competitive advantage of foreign producers who pay
lower wage rates than domestic producers;3
3. To assist in maintaining the United States international balance of
payments by preventing imports and expenditures abroad from rising
beyond the level of exports and foreign receipts;4 and
* Member of the New York Bar. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Profe:or
Richard N. Gardner of Columbia Law School for his assistance in developing many of the
conceptions underlying this article.
1. See Stewart, The Trade Agreements Legislation, in Foreign Trade Policy: Staff
for the Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy of the Committee on Ways and Mleans,
Compendium of Papers on U.S. Foreign Trade Policy 507, 512.-16, 535-39, 556-57 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Compendium]; Gardner, A Critique of United States Foregn
Economic Policy, 1959 U. Ill. L. F. 121.
2. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, The Role of the U.S. Tariff and the Effects of Changes
in Duty Rates, in Compendium op. cit. supra note 1, at 223; sEe, e.g., N.Y. Tim3 Feb. 29,
1960, p. 26, col. 7.
3. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, § 3, 75 StaL 6., amending 52 Stat.
1060 (1938), authorizes the Secretary of Labor to investigate and report to the Prczidcnt
and Congress on instances where foreign competition has reculted or is lilcly to rc:ult in
increased domestic unemployment. See also the proposed "Fair Labor Standards Trade
Act of 1961," S. 675, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), rcprec ntative of many elmilar bill;
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1961, p. 1, col. 3 (views of AFL-CIO); id., Jan. 17, 1909, § 1,
p. 57, col 1 (xiews of John L. Lewis). See generally the comments of Prc-idCnt KennCdy
concerning possble boycotts of foreign goods, id., March 9, 1961, p. 16, colh. 6-7; cf. id.,
April 19, 1961, p. 1, col. 2; Final Report to the Senate Comm. on Intertate & Foreign
Commerce by Special Staff on the Study of U.S. Foreign Commerce, ,7th Cong., let Secs,
The United States and World Trade; Challenges and Opportunities 120-26 (Comyn. Print
1961) [hereinafter cited as the 1961 Senate Trade Report]; ElLworth, The Intcrnatioral
Economy 3S3 (1950); Arnow, Foreign Trade and Collective Bargaining, 11 Lab. L J. 62
(1960); Teper, Discussion of the Arnow Paper, 11 Lab. L J. 671 (190); Tcplo w, Com-
ments on the Arnow Paper, 11 Lab. L.J. 676 (1960).
4. See Message to Congress by President Kennedy, Feb. 6, 1961, 'N.Y. Time:, Feb. 7,
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4. To maintain a strong domestic industrial base in fields of produc-
tion vital to national defense.'
I. THE PROBLEM
There can be no question concerning the importance of the goals
underlying these arguments for protection. However, a serious dilemma
is created because protectionist policies hamper cooperation with friendly
nations which is vital to our foreign policy." Protection also lessens the
amount of dollars available to foreign countries to purchase our exports
and may tend to cause economic retaliation by means of increased bar-
riers to United States products sold abroad. Further, it tends to promote
higher prices for domestic goods, and leads to uneconomic use of re-
sources by production at home of goods which could more economically
be purchased abroad.
Some resolution of this dilemma is crucial to both our foreign policy
and our economy. It is made particularly urgent because of a crescendo
of demands for increased protection,7 balanced by a similarly intensify-
ing series of protests from our allies, at a time when need for closer co-
operation with them is great. This conflict has led to a search for alterna-
tive means of promoting healthy domestic industries, high employment,
and a strong mobilization base, which do not have the disadvantages of
import barriers. One proposal has been to grant aid to domestic indus-
tries in adjusting to the consequences of reductions of trade barriers.8
1961, p. 16, cols. 3, 7; Anderson, The Balance of Payments Problems, 38 Foreign Affairs 419
(1960).
5. 68 Stat. 360 (1954), amended by 69 Stat. 166 (1955), as amended, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1352a (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960); see generally 1961 Senate Trade Report, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 138-42; Friedman, Rights of Importers Under Section 7B of the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1955, 25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427 (1957); Vernon, A Trade
Policy for the 1960s, 39 Foreign Affairs 458, 469 (1961); Note, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 505,
546 & n.253 (1961).
6. See Stewart, The Trade Agreements Legislation, in Compendium, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 508-16; Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy 7-23, 151 (1956); N.Y. Times,
March 12, 1959, p. 47, col. 6; id., Jan. 25, 1959, p. E 2, col. 4; id., April 29, 1960, p. 4,
col. 7.
7. See S. 2176, 87th Cong., 1st Sess (1961) (Senator Bridges' bill to regulate imports).
See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1961, p. 1, cols. 2-3; id., Nov. 5, 1959, p. 51, cols. 2-3; id.,
Oct. 14, 1959, p. 20, col. 1; id, Oct. 4, 1959, § 1, p. 9, col. 1; id., Sept. 22, 1959, p. 29,
col. 3; cf. note 3 supra.
8. E.g., S. 851, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 3918, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960);
S. 1609, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. 3664, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. 2907, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) ; 101 Cong. Rec. 3997-99 (1955) (proposed amendments to Extension
of Trade Agreements Act) ; 1961 Senate Trade Report, op. cit. supra note 3, at 144-60; Dem-
ocratic Platform, "The Rights of Man," Report of the Committee on Resolutions & Platform
as Adopted by the National Convention (1960), Section on "World Trade" 9 [hereinafter
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This, however, has encountered criticism on several grounds, one of
which is that adjustment to increasing imports is only one facet of a
much broader problem of adjustment to economic change in our econ-
omy.9
The problem of domestic unemployment and injury to domestic in-
dustries is in large part a problem of idleness of human and physical
resources. Such idleness sets back the nation's economic growth and
reduces the product available for national purposes including national
security. At the same time it imposes severe hardships"0 upon individ-
uals and businesses. And this quite naturally engenders resistance to
economic change which it is feared might intensify the injury or cause
it to recur." Some of the chief causes of economic injury12 are:
1. Business cycles, which at worst can produce catastrophic idleness
as in the nineteen thirties;
2. Technical advances which displace workers and sometimes entire
industries; 3
cited as Democratic Platform, section on World Trade (19)] ; Ruttenber, Problems
of Adjustment for American Industry in the Light of United States Forcign Trade Policy,
in Compendium, op. cit. supra note 1, at 731-32; Propoeal of David J. McDonald of
the United Steelworkers of America in Report to the PreAident and the Con-rec2, Com-
mission on Foreign Economic Policy 56 (1954) [hcrdnaftcr cited as Randall Report];
Staff Papers, presented to the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, 3S4-96 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Randall Staff Papers]; Lindeman & Salant, Ass-istance for Adjustment
to Tariff Reductions, in U.S. Cong., Senate Special Comm. on Unemployment, C6th Cong,
2d Sess. (1960) [hereinafter cited as Lindeman & Salant]; Ruttenberg & SdEdman
Trade Adjustment Program, in Committee for a National Trade Policy, Cenference on
Trade Policy (Roundtable No. 5) (1960); United States Council, International Chamber
of Commerce, Principles of an International Trade Policy for the United State3 6 (19G1);
New York Chamber of Commerce, A Foreign Trade Policy for the 'I03 (1961); Clubb &
Reischer, The Trade Adjustment Bills: Their Purpose & Efacacy, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 490
(1961); Neal, New Economic Policies for the Wct, 39 Forcign Affair3 247, 250 (1961);
Reischer, Adjustment to Imports and the National Interezt, 26 J. Bus. 254 (1953);
Reischer, Assistance in Adjusting to a Tariff Reduction, 26 J. Bus. 103 (1953).
9. Randall Report, op. cit. supra note 8, at 54; Wilcox, Relief for Victims of Tarif
Cuts, 40 Am. Econ. Rev. S34 (1950).
10. Some of the effects of unemployment are discussed in Economic Brief for Appvllcu
pp. 46-53, Chamberlin v. Andrews, 299 U.S. 515 (1936). One of the most serious forms
of damage is psychological: a feeling on the part of many unemployed wor,:xr that
they are nonessential, that society does not care about them. Sce Drucker, Conept of
the Corporation 140, 179 (Beacon paperback ed. 1960) ; Drucker, The Future of Indutrial
Alan 101-117 (1942).
11. See, e.g., Barnett, Machinery and Labor (1926).
12. See generally S. Rep. No. 61, 37th Cong., 1t Szs,. (1961); Economic Bricf for
Appellees, pp. 61-93, Chamberlin v. Andrews, 299 U.S. 515 (1936).
13. For some striking examples see generally National A-s'n of Window G2ss
Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403 (1923); Manpower Utilization and Retrain!P7, Hear-
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3. The growth and improvement of transportation services which con-
tinually enlarge markets, making available new sources of supply and
limiting the market power of producers within any geographical area;"
and
4. Changes in plant location and movements of industry from one part
of the country to another.' 5
While the injury which would be caused by a thoroughgoing reduction
of our present trade barriers may be small in relation to the injuries due
to other causes with which we must deal,'" this injury would be con-
centrated in specific industries and localities 7 whose claims to fairness
cannot be ignored.
The problem of low-wage competition is closely related to that of
economic injury. Low-wage competition disturbs us as profoundly as it
does because it destroys opportunities for high-wage employment for
American workingmen when other equally valuable opportunities are
ings Before the Subcommittee on Unemployment and the Impact of Automation, of the
House Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Training of the
Unemployed, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower, Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Hearings on the
Impact of Automation on Employment Before the Subcommittee on Unemployment and
the Impact of Automation of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961), and accompanying report; Hearings and Report of the Subcommittee on
Economic Stabilization, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Automation and Techno-
logical Changes, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); AFL-CIO, Automation and Major Technolog-
ical Change: Collective Bargaining Problems (1958); Adams & Aronson, Workers and
Industrial Change: A Case Study of Labor Mobility (1957); Barnett, Machinery and
Labor (1926).
14. Commons, American Shoemakers, 1648-1895: A Sketch of Industrial Evolution,
24 Q. J. Econ. 39-84 (1909). Thorp, Economic Institutions 93-96 (1928). The judicial
response to this extension of markets may be seen in the expansion of the scope of the
federal commerce power. See United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfr's Ass'n, 336 U.S.
460, 464 (1949); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 229-31 (1948). Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) and United
States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill
(1942) and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
15. See Kennedy, New England and the South: The Struggle for Industry, 193 Atlantic
Monthly 32 (1954).
16. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, The Role of the United States Tariff and the Effects of
Changes in the Duty Rates, in Compendium, op. cit. supra note 1, at 223; Piquet, Tariff
Reductions and United States Imports, in Compendium, op. cit. supra note 1, at 231-32;
Salant, The Short-Term Domestic Economic Effects of Reducing Import Barriers, In
Compendium, op. cit. supra note 1, at 278-79; Randall Staff Papers, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 373; Lindeman & Salant, op. cit. supra note 8, at 261-66; Piquet, Aid, Trade, and the
Tariff (1953); Salant, Employment Effects of United States Import Liberalization, Papers
and Proceedings of the Seventy-Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Ass'n, in 50 Am. Econ. Rev. 419 (1960).
17. See authorities cited in notes, 2, 8 & 16 supra.
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hard to find without undertaking the expensive and risky burden of mov-
ing to a new location or learning a new trade. If there were an abun-
dance of available and appropriate jobs without the necessity of a dis-
placed employee moving or financing the learning of new skills, we might
be more willing than we are to purchase the items sold by the low-wage
competitors, thereby obtaining the goods at less cost to ourselves, and
turning the displaced manpower into more efficient industries. However,
this ideal situation does not exist. Economic injury to domestic indus-
tries, whether due to domestic or foreign causes, low-wage or otherwise,
leaves both businesses and workers with lessened opportunities and the
unpleasant prospect of changing locations or trades if they are to earn
a living.
The problem of maintaining an adequate industrial base for our na-
tional defense is also closely related to the basic problem of economic
injury. There are some items which should undoubtedly be produced at
home or in nearby nations for defense reasons. But because of the prob-
lem of economic injury, every domestic industry is tempted to assert
that its product is vital to defense and hence must be produced at home.
The resulting political pressures inevitably tend to convert the defense
problem into an excuse for broadening protectionism at the cost of con-
sumers, taxpayers and our foreign policy,"6 far beyond any extent actu-
ally justified on defense grounds. In any event, anything approaching
full self-sufficiency even in defense-related items is impossible as a prac-
tical matter.
The balance of payments problem is also closely related to the ques-
tion of economic injury. If this problem were the only issue, it could be
approached by seeking to increase our own productivity and seehing to
have other countries remove their barriers to United States exports and
share in giving aid to developing areas, rather than by invoking protec-
tionism.'9 Furthermore, there have been indications that U. S. exports
1. See Schulsinger, Legal Aids for Meeting Import Competition, Prac. Law., Ot.
1959, p. 27.
19. See Message to Congress by President Kennedy, Feb. 6, 1061, N.Y. Timec:, Feb. 7,
1961, p. 16, cols. 3, 7, wherein the President stated that "a rctum to protctionm is
not a solution. Such a course would provoke retaliation; and the balance of trade, which
is now substantially in our favor, could be turned agaimt us vith disastru cffects to
the dollar. . .. Quota discriminations against Anerican exports have largcy dapparcdl
vwith the return of currency convertibility. We v.il prt.zs for prompt removal of the few
restrictions that still exist, as well as for the maximum liberalization of rcmainin-, non-
discriminatory quotas in other industrialized countries, which apply mainly to agrculturl
exports. In the tariff negotiations now going forward under GATT we shall cch the
fullest possible measure of tariff reduction by foreign countries to the bncfit of our
exports.' See also Gardner, Strategy for the Dollar, 33 Foredn Affairs 433 (l95); cf.
Viner, Economic Foreign Policy on the New Frontier, 39 Forcign Affairs 5C9, 573-77 (1961).
19611
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have excellent long-term prospects.2 °
The basic dilemma, around which these difficulties revolve, is how to
deal with economic injuries to domestic industries--injuries due to many
differing causes. Protection is one of several possible approaches to this
problem.
II. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO DEALING
WITH ECONOMIC INJURY
A. Protection
One response to injury due to economic change is to seek to prevent
the change or to cancel its effect by restricting the supply of the com-
modity or service or raising its price. In a broad sense all such efforts
may be considered as forms of "protection" because they seek to shelter
existing economic positions from change. Private agreements to fix
prices,21 share markets2 or exclude new competition 3 as approaches to
protection in this broad sense have been subjected to antitrust prohibi-
tions; but similar objectives may be sought by other means within the
domestic economy, such as securing regulatory action to limit entry into
an industry 4 or regulatory approval of price coordination among com-
petitors.25
Employees have also sought protection in some cases through re-
strictive work rules, by limitations upon entry into skilled trades, and
jurisdictional rules assigning categories of work to limited groups.20
20. See N.Y. Times National Economic Review, Jan. 11, 1960, p. 93, col. 8; cf. Foreign
Commerce Weekly, Dec. 21, 1959, pp. 16-21.
21. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); see United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). On the underlying similarity of private
"protectionism" and import barriers, see Thorelli, Federal Antitrust Policy 62 (Stock-
holm ed. 1954) ; Goldstein, The Tariff is the Mother of Trusts, 39 Texas L. Rev. 711, 715
(1961).
22. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 241 (1899); Report
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study The Antitrust Laws 26 (1955).
23. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1951); American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
24. For varying views on this problem see Edwards, Maintaining Competition (1949);
Hale & Hale, Competition or Control (pt. 1): The Chaos in the Cases, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev.
641 (1958); Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 436 (1954). Compare the
attitude expressed in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), with
FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953). Also compare Note, Economic
Injury in FCC Licensing: The Public Interest Ignored, 67 Yale L.J. 135 (1957), with R. A.
Givens, Refusal of Radio and Television Licenses on Economic Grounds, 46 Va. L. Rev.
1391 (1960).
25. E.g., 62 Stat. 472 (1948), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5a-Sb (1958) (railroad rate
bureaus).
26. See Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management 164-66 (1941).
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Collective bargaining, however, is not protectionist where it seeks to
assure a wide distribution of the benefits of economic change through
improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions, or to allocate
the burden of economic injury when it occurs through seniority rules
and work-sharing arrangements rather than to block economic change.'-
Organization of employees to counterbalance the unified bargaining
power of their employer is not comparable to organization of sellers in
a consumer market. Consumers are normally unorganized so that their
power does not need to be balanced by countervailing power.3  This
distinction has been recognized in the legal protectionF9 and antitrust
immunity3 granted to collective bargaining. However, combinations of
unions and employers which control the market available to the con-
sumer have been held to constitute antitrust violations3 ' and some statu-
tory provisions aimed at practices such as make-work devices 2 and ju-
risdictional strikesI3 have been enacted.
The drive of producers to limit outside competition and to secure gov-
ernmental aid to do so has powerful political force. However, it is bal-
anced by strong opposition from other domestic producers and industries
which also fight for their competing interests. These countervailing ef-
forts offset each other, and the airing of the conflicting arguments can
help the public to make choices based upon paramount national inter-
ests. Each producer has a greater interest in his product than a con-
sumer has in any single product, and hence the political influence of
producers may be more powerful than that of customers in any given
case. But so long as each producer's interest is counterbalanced by the
27. See generally Barnett, Machinery and Labor (1926).
28. Cf. Galbraith, American Capitalism 117-39 (1956).
29. See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), amended by 61 Stat.
140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1953).
30. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); ApQz Ho-icry Co. v. Lcadcr,
310 U.S. 469 (1940); see Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Anayzi:,
104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 252 (1955); Dooley, Antitrust Lqqulation and Labor Unions, 11
Lab. LJ. 911 (1960); R. A. Givens, Dealing With National Emergency Labor DLputc,
34 Temp. L. Q. 17, 2S-31 (1960) and authorities cited.
31. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Eke. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
32. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), amended by 65 Stat. 601 (1951), amended by 73 Stat. 525,
542 (1959), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 15S(b) (6) (Supp. I, 1959-19r0). The cff'ectvcne:3 of
this limitation on "featherbedding" was severely limited by NLRB v. Gamble Enter-
prises, 345 U.S. 117 (1953), and American Newspaper Pub. As!'n v. INTLRB, 345 U-S. 1
(1953). Compare also United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947), with the !ame ca2
in the district court, 75 F. Supp. 176 (NID. Ill. 1943).
33. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 140 (1947)x as amcndcd, 29 US C.
§ 15S(b) (4) (d) (Supp. II, 1959-1960); see INLRB v. Radio & Tdkvion Brcadcat En. 'r.
Union, 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
1961]
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interests of others competing with him34 the consumer voice remains im-
portant in determining the outcome.
It is obvious that lack of representation in the political forum of an
important group of competitors completely upsets this balance. Lack of
representation in the political process on the part of groups affected by
its results is in fact considered to have such a prejudicial effect that the
courts have exercised particularly searching judicial review under such
broad constitutional provisions as the due process clause and the com-
merce clause in order to protect such groups.3 5
In view of the lack of political representation of foreign producers, it
is not surprising that restriction of competition from them has been a
popular way to seek protection from economic injury. To a considerable
extent this has meant not merely protection from injury due to imports,
but also limitation of imports as a means of strengthening the position
of a domestic industry against economic injury from other sources. For
this reason it is natural that demands for protectionist measures become
most vocal during business downturns or when an industry is threatened
by technological change, competition from other industries or parts of
the country, or changes in tastes.
Our tariffs have had a fluctuating history, dependent upon changing
economic needs and political pressures, and attaining one of the highest
levels with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930.0 Considerable reductions
have been achieved under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act as succes-
sively extended by Congress.37 However, the trade program has been quali-
fied by the insertion since World War II of a "peril point" provision",
34. Compare the "private attorney general" function performed by private antitrust
suits and the role of competitors in regulatory proceedings. See FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940); Note, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 683 n.71 (1958).
35. Chief justice Stone led the Court in developing the doctrine that where resort
to the ballot and to the processes of democratic government were available, the Supreme
Court should exercise careful judicial self-restraint in passing upon the validity of legis-
lation, but where political checks were not adequate or where the political processes or
freedoms necessary to them were endangered, searching judicial review of legislative judg-
ments was justified. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945) ; see United States v. Carolene PrOds. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ; Dowling, The Methods of Mr. Justice Stone in Constitutional
Cases, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 1160, 1165-78 (1941); R. A. Givens, The Impartial Constitutional
Principles Supporting Brown v. Board of Education, 6 How. L.J. 179 (1960); R. A.
Givens, Federal Protection of Employee Rights Within Trade Unions, 29 Fordham L. Rev.
259 (1960) and cases cited.
36. 46 Stat. 590 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1001-654 (1958) (Supp. II 1959-
1960). On tariff history, see Snider, Introduction to International Economics 422-27
(Rev. ed. 1958) ; Taussig, Tariff History of the United States (8th ed. 1931).
37. 48 Stat. 943 (1934), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1351-67 (1958).
38. Trade Agreements Extention Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 72, as amended, 19 U.SC.
[Vol. 30
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requiring a determination prior to the granting of a concession whether
it will seriously injure domestic industry., and an "escape clause ' 1 9 under
which the Tariff Commission must recommend to the President the with-
drawal or modification of any concession which is causing serious injury
to domestic producers. Presidential disapproval of "escape clause" rec-
ommendations is subject to overruling by two-thirds of both Houses of
Congress.4 Furthermore, the President, advised by the Office of Civil
and Defense Mobilization, is directed by a provision11 first enacted in
1954 to limit imports which are found to imperil national security. In
1959 mandatory oil import quotas were established under this provi-
sion.' One problem concerning the national security provision is that
import curbs motivated by politically inspired pressures for protection
can be nominally imposed on national security grounds which it is diffi-
cult for opponents to challenge effectively. "a The President may also
impose import restrictions to effectuate the aims of the domestic farm
price support program.4  Another protectionist measure is the Buy
American Act of 1933, granting preferences to domestic suppliers in
Government procurement4 5
§ 1360 (1953). On the effect of this kind of procedure on trade libaralization, cf. IKraider,
Democratic Processes in the Trade Agreements Program, 34 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 317 (1R40).
39. 65 Stat. 73 (1951), as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1363, 1364 (1953).
40. 65 Stat. 74 (1951), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (195S).
41. 6S Stat. 360 (1954), amended by 69 Stat. 166 (1955), as amended, 19 U.S C.
§ 1352a (195S). On the national security proviion, fe gncerally 1961 Secnate Trade
Report, op. cit. supra note 3, at 133-42; Friedman, Rig-hts of Importer: Under SEcction 7B
of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, 25 Gco. Wash. L. Rev. 427 (1957);
Vernon, A Trade Policy for the 1960s, 39 Foreign Affairs 45", 469 (1961); Note, 61 Colum.
L. Rev. 505, 546 & n.253 (1961).
42. Proclamation No. 3279, 24 Fed. Reg. 1731 (1959); see N.Y. Times, March 11, 1959,
p. 47, col. 1, p. 57, cols. 2-4. For criticism, see, eg., id., March 22, 1959, § 3, p. F1,
col. 8; 6 National Review 606-07 (March 23, 1959).
43. "There are now a substantial number of administrative proccdures intended not to
eliminate foreign trade or to preserve intrinsically uneconomic industry but rather to
eliminate foreign trade abuses, to temper the economic impact of imports, and to maintain
the mobilization base required by the national security. Thcse procedures may Eignificantly
aid the American businessman in his efforts to hold and to e.pand a fair share of the
American market against foreign competition. . . . The guidelines include coneidcration
of national defense needs, anticipated availabilities, industrial growth rcquircment, the
impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual domcAic indutric:,
unemployment, loss of investment-all in the context of national sccurity." Schu.incr,
Legal Aids for Meeting Import Competition, Prac. Law., Oct. 1959. pp. 27, 32.
44. 49 Stat. 773 (1935), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1953). Since 64 Stat. 261 (1950),
as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 624(f) (195S), this section explicitly prevails over any trade agrce-
ment in case of conflict.
45. 47 Stat. 1520 (1933), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-lWd (1953). For criticzm eeec,
e.g., 1961 Senate Trade Report, op. cit. supra note 3, at 143; Gantt & Speck, Dometic v.
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The original objective of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was
stated to be to assist recovery from the depression by stimulating U. S.
exports.4" The act sought to expand our trade by permitting us to bar-
gain for the reduction of other nations' trade barriers and by importing
more so that other countries would have dollars with which to pay for
our exports. These objectives conflicted with the desire to protect do-
mestic industries by restricting imports, but the conflict was largely a
matter of the extent to which trade liberalization or import restriction
would most effectively promote the common objective of both policies-
the promotion of domestic- prosperity. During World War II, however,
trade liberalization began to be viewed as not merely a means to domestic
prosperity, but also as a key part of a structure to promote world co-
operation and lasting peace.47 Since 1946, the struggle to strengthen the
free world against Soviet imperialism has been uppermost as the goal of
our foreign economic policies, including our trade policies.48 These objec-
tives are of a different order than the promotion of domestic prosperity
alone, and therefore the conflicts between protection and trade liberaliza-
tion have taken on a new dimension, even though the formal purpose
clause of the Trade Agreements Act does not yet reflect the altered
reasons for its periodic extensions49 and the altered spirit animating its
administration.50 Whether the change in administration in advance of
a change in language is improper"' depends on one's view of the func-
tions of statutory language. It might be argued that our system of gov-
ernment can only work effectively if the pressure of facts and events"2
lead us to interpret language so as to fulfill its fundamental objectives
Foreign Trade Problems in Federal Government Contracting: Buy American Act and Execu-
tive Order, 7 J. Pub. L. 378 (1958); Knapp, The Buy American Act: A Review and Assess-
ment, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 430 (1961).
46. 48 Stat. 943 (1934), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (1958); see Stewart, The
Trade Agreements Legislation, in Compendium, op. cit. supra note 1, at 508-11.
47. See id. at 512-16; Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy 7-23 (1956).
48. See Lindeman and Salant, op. cit. supra note 8, at 264; Stewart, The Trade Agree-
ments Legislation, in Compendium, op. cit. supra note 1, at 518-20; Gardner, op. cit. supra
note 47, at 248-54; Neal, New Economic Policies for the West, 39 Foreign Affairs 247
(1961); Vernon, A Trade Policy for the 1960s, 39 Foreign Affairs 458 (1961).
49. Stewart, The Trade Agreements Legislation, in Compendium, op. cit. supra note
1, at 512-20, 556-57.
50. Id. at 535-39, 547-50, 556-57. See proposals for amendment of the act including
the purpose clause, to accord with its changing objectives in Gardner, Proposals for
Legislative Reform of the Trade Agreements Act, in Compendium, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 491.
51. Stewart, The Trade Agreements Legislation, in Compendium, op. cit. supra note 1,
passim.
52. Cf. Stone, Law and Its Administration 48 (1915).
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as nearly as possible in light of the circumstances of their application.P
It has accordingly been held that long-continued practice under a statute
may be significant in its interpretation 4 even if the interpretation so
arrived at conflicts with the usual or ordinary meaning of the words of
the statute.- Of course, Congress retains the authority to correct any
interpretation by making its intent clear through a statutory amendment.
In the case of reciprocal trade, the underlying assumption,," properly at-
tributed to Congress, of concern for our position in the world, together
with the changed circumstances, would seem to justify the altered ob-
jectives of the administration of the act.
Import barriers, like other forms of protectionism in its broad sense,
do not promote the allocation of resources most conducive to maximum
efficiency.17 They tend to raise domestic prices by limiting outside com-
petition, thus contributing to any latent inflationary tendencies- 3 They
may permit laxness and inefficiency to develop in an industry which
would otherwise be stimulated to greater productive efforts. 9 What may
be even more critical is that they tend to injure our foreign relations in
a serious way which is sometimes completely out of proportion to the
economic interest involved. This may take the form of a publicized is-
sue to which other grievances may be attached until the matter becomes
a cause clbre"C Friendly nations abroad are also injured economically,
which in some cases may be more harmful to our world position-and
harder to remedy-than would a similar economic injury at home. In
the case of manufacturing industries vital to national defense, import
curbs may tend to support a mobilization base, though at the expense of po-
litical friendship abroad which may have even more urgent defense impli-
cations. In the case of extractive industries, import curbs tend to ex-
haust domestic reserves"' by using them up more rapidly, as well as
to alienate nations which may be essential foreign sources of supply.c2
53. See Stone, J. in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317-18 (1941).
54. Alaska S.S. Corp. v. United States, 290 U.S. 256 (1933).
55. See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1392).
56. Cf. Stone, J. in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, IS-S9 (1936); Holmcn,
J. in Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 2S0 U.S. 379, 33 (1930).
57. Ellsworth, The International Economy 111-219, 323-4C5 (1950).
58. Id. at 402-06; see N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1959, p. 21, col. 4; id., March 16, 1959, p. 21,
col. 3.
59. See Tariff Cuts: Who Gets Hurt? Fortune, April 1954, p. 13,3.
60. E.g., Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy 151 (1956); N.Y. Time, April 29, 19co,
p. 4, col. 7; id., March 12, 1959, p. 47, col. 6; id., Jan. 25, 1959, § 4, p. EZ, col. 4.
61. See Snyder, The Stockpiling of Strategic Materials 370 (1956) (unpublihcd thcci,
in Columbia University, Butler Library); see, e.g., the diecircion of mangane-- in Rourcb,
Strategic mineral Supplies (1939); See also 6 National Rcieiw COG-07 (March 23, 1959).
62. Snyder, op. cit. supra note 61, at 379-37. We may aLo interfere vith our own
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For these reasons, protection, while one approach to the problem of eco-
nomic injury, has such serious drawbacks that every alternative to it
must be examined.
B. Reliance Upon Self-Adjustment
The Commission on Foreign Economic Policy headed by Clarence B.
Randall took the position in 1954, in its report to President Eisenhower
and Congress, that the problem of injury due to imports or due to the
reduction of trade barriers was part of a much broader problem, and
that there was therefore no justification for singling out those injured
by imports for special assistance denied to others . 3 The Commission
reasoned that since it is not contended that the Government should bear
the burden of all forms of economic adjustment in a free economy, there
should be no special concession to those hurt by imports. The essential
position taken by the report was that reliance should be placed upon
self-adjustment by means of economic forces free from particularized
intervention, using the measures which we had already adopted, such as
unemployment compensation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, and the monetary powers of the Federal Reserve System as built-in
devices tending to support stability for the economy as a whole. While
many would find this a sound position from the viewpoint of economic
theory, others might contend that the injury during the period of ad-
justment would require alleviation by governmental action. But in either
event, it seems extremely doubtful that the strong and persistent political
pressures working for protection can be overcome for any long period
without some supplemental approach for dealing with economic injury.""
Further, in the intensifying economic competition of the free world with
totalitarian regimes, the idle resources accompanying economic injury
are a serious drag upon economic growth, and also tend to encourage
sources of supply by practices which create uncertainty in the administration of our
import policies even where no restriction is ultimately imposed. See, on the administration
of our anti-dumping program in this respect, Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International
Price Discrimination: United States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 Colum.
L. Rev. 44 (1958). As to the essential nature of foreign supplies of many important
minerals see Snyder, op. cit. supra note 61, at 370; Paley, Resources for Freedom (1952)
(Report of President's Materials Policy Comm'n).
63. Randall Report, op. cit. supra note 8 at 54; accord, Wilcox, Relief for the Victims
of Tariff Cuts, 40 Am. Econ. Rev. 884-85 (1950).
64. See 104 Cong. Rec. 6136-38 (daily ed. April 22, 1958); cf. N.Y. Times, June 11,
1958, p. 49, col. 1; id., April 30, 1958, p. 45, col. 6; id., April 22, 1958, p. 29, col. 5;
id., April 15, 1958, p. 1, col. 6, p. 16, col. 3. Compare Ellsworth, The International Econ-
omy 401-02 (1950). Substantial, though not total, reliance on self-adjustment is, of course,
assumed by the proponents of most of the assistance proposals. See 1961 Senate Trade Re-
port op. cit. supra note 3, at 141-48.
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political opposition to technological change and to other forms of eco-
nomic advance. It is therefore essential to consider further approaches
to supplement the self-adjustment relied upon by the Commission.
C. Assistance Limited to Those Injured
by Imports or by Reduction of Trade Barriers
As early as 1950, proposals for some kind of assistance to industries
injured by trade liberalization were under discussionSc5 As a member of
the Randall Commission, David J. McDonald of the United Steelwork-
ers proposed in 1954 that whenever the President rejected a Tariff Com-
mission recommendation for an increase in import barriers under the
'"escape clause," the domestic industry concerned should become eligible
for adjustment assistance.0 , The European Economic Community
Treaty signed in 1957 looked toward assistance to those injured by the
projected implementation of its Common Market.Y7  Senators John F.
Kennedy3: and Jacob K. Javits"' introduced bills providing for adjustment
assistance similar to that proposed by Mr. McDonald. Support for leg-
islation of this type has accumulated steadily in the past few years, as
is evidenced by the fact that the underlying concept of adjustment as-
sistance was also endorsed in the Democratic Platform of 1960.'0
There are two possible concepts of such aid: (a) that it is compensa-
tion to the domestic industry and its employees for injury which they
have suffered, 71 or (b) that the aid is not intended as compensation. but
as transitional assistance to help the industry and its employees adjust
to the altered economic realities by such means as entering new fields of
work or increasing efficiency, and thus becoming again self-reliant. 2
The compensation concept is particularly vulnerable to the criticism,
made by the Randall Commission, that it is unfair to have the public
65. See Wilcox. Relief for the Victims of Tariff Cute. 40 Am. Econ. Rev. ,4 (19 0).
66. Randall Report, op. ciL supra note 8, at 56. See aho Ruttcnbcr,., in Compmndium,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 781.
67. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, pt. 3 tit. III, ch. 2, arts.
125, 127, 29S U.N.T.S. 63, 64 (1957); id. it. IV, 290 U.N.TS. at 64. See Di eold, The
Schuman Plan, A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950-1959. 4C4-26 t1959).
63. S. 2907, S5th Cong., lst Sess. (1957); 101 Cong. Rcc. 3997-99 (1955) (v.ith Senator
Humphrey); S. 3650, Sd Cong., 2d Sees. (1954).
69. S. 851, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 3918, 86th Cong., 2d Scs. (1960); S, Ms9,
S6th Cong., 1t Sees. (1959); S. 3664, qqth Cong., 2d Secz. 1955).
70. Democratic Platform, section on World Trade (1960), op. cit. cupra note ,3,
71. No compensation was given to the victims of other governmental policic:3 -uch as
prohibition, nor for the compulsory dosing of gold mines during World War I. Sze
United States v. Central Eurela Mlining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1953). But cf. Pcnwylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Holmes, J,).
72. See 1961 Senate Trade Report, op. cit. supra note 3 at 155-56; Lindcman & SaLnt,
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bear the burden of economic adjustment for one group but not for others.
Further, aid not tied to transitional efforts (such as any form of blanket
tax benefit for an entire industry) might actually encourage new firms to
enter the industry concerned and thus magnify the problem of future
adjustment.
In an article, 73 written in 1950, Clair Wilcox points out two very
cogent arguments against the entire concept of special aid to the victims
of tariff cuts:
1. The debate over special assistance, which many domestic indus-
tries would not in any event prefer to protection, 74 would be bound to
lead to exaggeration of the injury involved, so that the political diffi-
culties of trade liberalization would become even greater than in the
absence of an assistance program. This criticism is especially applicable
where the assistance would be tied to a Presidential rejection of a Tariff
Commission recommendation for relief under the "escape clause," since
the choice before the President would appear to be between saving the
taxpayer's money by adopting protection or aiding foreign industry at
the taxpayer's expense. The fact that the consumer (who is also a tax-
payer) pays both for protection and for increased defense costs if our
foreign policy is placed in jeopardy, would be easily lost to view in such
a context. If, contrary to the reasoning of Professor Wilcox, aid is to be
limited to the victims of a single cause of economic injury, trade liberal-
ization, such aid would still seem to be more workable either entirely in-
dependent of the escape clause or as a substitute for the escape clause
rather than subordinated to it.
2. If eligibility is to depend upon the cause of dislocation, the problem
of determining who is eligible for assistance would prove incredibly dif-
ficult. This criticism is borne out in large part by the difficulties already
encountered by the Tariff Commission in defining serious injury under
the "escape clause. "7  Depending upon the criterion for assistance
adopted, it might also become necessary to determine the extent to which
op. cit. supra note 8 at 257-58; Democratic Platform, section on World Trade (1960),
op. cit. supra note 8. This has been the concept of much of our foreign aid, such as the
Marshall Plan and "Point 4" aid.
73. Wilcox, Relief for the Victims of Tariff Cuts, 40 Am. Econ. Rev. 884 (1950).
74. See N.Y. Times, April 30, 1958, § 2, p. 45, col. 6. See also Lindeman & Salant,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 269.
75. See Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways & Means, on Renewal of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 190-91 (1958); N.Y. Times,
June 15, 1958, § 3, p. F1, col. 8. Compare the conflicting views of what constitutes Injury
expressed in U.S. Tariff Commission, Watches, Movements and Parts, Report to the Presi-
dent on Escape Clause Investigation No. 26 (1954), with the confusion and pressures
faced by Congress in attempting to set tariffs directly as detailed in Taussig, Tariff History
of the United States (8th ed. 1931).
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injury was caused (or solely caused) by a tariff concession in negotia-
tions in the recent past or even the distant past, an elusive task at best."0
The determination of availability of aid to an industry or employee
based on such uncertain criteria would be bound to be viewed as dis-
criminatory and hence both raise resentment and leave the way open for
charges of exercise of political pressure and improper influence.
It may be argued that aid limited to the victims of tariff cuts is not
discriminatory because their plight is due to governmental policy. How-
ever, this is also true of injury due to other causes as well. The commerce
clause77 permitting free trade among the states of the Union, with its
resulting benefits and hardships, is as much a governmental policy as
trade concessions to other nations. So are the effects of increases or de-
creases in government purchases, wartime and peacetime regulation of
all kinds, changes in interest rates, and other economic policies. Of course
there may be a difference in degree where a particularly high trade bar-
rier is lowered suddenly to the detriment of those who bad entered or
remained in the field in reliance upon it
Another argument against special assistance solely limited to the vic-
tims of trade liberalization is that industries whose difficulties are not
due to imports may seek protection against foreign competition as en-
ergetically as those whose injuries are due to imports or to reductions
of trade barriers. Assistance would not be available to such industries if
it were limited to the victims of reductions of import barriers, and hence,
such assistance would not provide an alternative to the drive for in-
creased protection in such cases.
The conclusion of Professor Wilcox's article, however, is not that we
should fall back upon protection or rely upon self-adjustment alone.
Instead, he calls for an overall effort to assist economic adjustments re-
gardless of whether the necessity arises from increases in imports or
from any other particular cause. Such an approach would supplement
the self-adjustment envisioned by the Randall Commission, and yet
avoid the objections to a program limited to the victims of tariff cuts.
Furthermore, it would aid adjustment due to dislocation arising from
other causes, such as changes in technology and shifts of industry within
the country. Dislocation due to such causes as technological unemploy-
ment requires our attention as urgently as dislocation due to increases
in imports.
Both a 1961 Senate staff study"M and an article by Richard N. Gard-
ner, then Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, now Deputy
76. Wilcox, Relief for the Victims of Tariff Cuts, 40 Am. Econ. Rev. 24, fS9 (1950).
77. U.S. Const. art. I, § S, cl. 3.
78. 1961 Senate Trade Report, op. cit. supra note 3, at 145-CO.
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Assistant Secretary of State7 9 have suggested that assistance to indus-
tries hindered by trade liberalization be coordinated with assistance for
adjustment to economic injury due to other causes, such as the recently
enacted depressed areas program. 0 Such integration of any program of
trade adjustment assistance into overall programs for promoting eco-
nomic development is of paramout importance in meeting the objections
to a trade adjustment program pointed out by Professor Wilcox and by
the Randall Commission. In order for these objections to be fully met
and for the problem of discrimination to be entirely obviated, the in-
tegration should be complete. Assistance to those injured by trade liber-
alization would be a major reason for the overall development program,
but the trade adjustment program would lose its separate identity. Eligi-
bility would not depend upon whether the cause of injury was trade
liberalization, technological change, or other causes, but rather upon
the existence of a problem of economic dislocation, the types of assistance
which would aid in adjustment, and the availability of private and gov-
ernmental resources for such assistance. Under such a synthesis, the ar-
guments for aid to those injured by tariff cuts would be of far-reaching
importance in shaping measures for assisting adjustment to economic
change, but the objections to a trade adjustment program which would
apply if a trade adjustment program were separate would not exist. To
examine whether such a program could prove workable and effective,
we must consider some of the measures which have been proposed to
promote the fullest use of human and physical resources as part of a
trade adjustment program or otherwise.
D. Measures to Promote Full Utilization of Resources
Promotion of the fullest use of our resources is of great importance at
a time when accelerated economic growth is urgent to strengthen the
free world. Such an effort, while seeking to promote economic growth,
would at the same time deal with injury due to trade liberalization and
seek to provide an alternative to protection as a means of assisting in-
dividuals and businesses facing economic distress. The drawbacks found
in aid limited to injury due to a single specific cause would not exist.
79. Gardner, Foreword, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 313, 317 (1961).
80. 75 Stat. 47 (1961); See generally S. Rep. No. 61, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961);
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on
S.1, S.6, S.9, & S.750, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Report of Task Force on Distressed
Areas, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1961, p. 16, col. 1; Samuelson, Report to the President, Pros-
pects and Policies for the 1961 American Economy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1961, p. 18; Ran-
dall Staff Papers, op. cit. supra note 8, at 389-90; Lubin, Reducing Unemployment In
Depressed Areas, 50 Am. Econ. Rev. 162 (1960); cf. 69 Stat. 683 (1955), 7 U.S.C. § 347a
(1958) (depressed farm areas).
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Determination of the precise cause of injury in particular cases could
be avoided and no implication of a right to compensation for injury due
to any particular cause would arise. Steps in these directions have al-
ready been taken through such means as the Employment Act of 194611
and the establishment of the unemployment compensation system,"' and
the depressed areas program.
Full production policies have sometimes encouraged imports with-
out correspondingly stimulating exports, thus creating or aggravating
a deficit in the balance of payments of gold and foreign exchange.P3
But this problem, as President Kennedy has pointed out, " can be dealt
with in many ways, consistent with encouraging a growing economy.
For example, many nations have erected discriminatory trade barriers
against United States exports because they did not have the dollars to
pay for the United States goods which they desired, so that such dollars
as were available had to be carefully hoarded for essential purchases.P
Now that the dollar reserves of many other countries have risen, we
can seek to deal with our balance of payments problem by pointing out
that these discriminatory curbs, in which our Government had acquiesced
as a means of easing the post-war dollar shortage, are now so unnecessary
that we have vigorously pressed for their abolition.80 Reductions in
United States trade barriers could also be used as a bargaining lever to
secure elimination of some of these discriminatory barriers67 In the
past, we have sought complete elimination of such barriers, such as
British Imperial Preference, s even though not specifically directed
81. 60 Stat. 23 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25 (195S). Section 2 of the act
declares it is to be the continuing responsibility of the Fedcral Government to promote
maximum employment, production and purchasing power by mcans of the broad policies
set forth. 60 Stat. 23 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1021 (1953).
82. 49 Stat. 626 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-03 (195S) (Supp. II, 1959-19CO).
Other existing built-in stabilizers include the Federal DMposit Insurance Corporation and
Securities and Exchange Commission disclosure requirements to protect invczteor, the
effect of the federal income tax system of reducing tax liability and tax rates ,hcn income
falls even in the absence of further change in the tax law at the time, Social Security re-
tirement benefits, and many other state and federal programs.
83. Cf. Ellsworth, The International Economy 331-37 (1W50).
84. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1961, p. 16 (text of Preoident Kennedy's mc:zage to Con-
gress on U.S. balance of payments).
85. See Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy 331-36 (1956).
86. See note 19 supra.
87. Cf. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy 103, 151 (1956).
8S. "The idea of 'preference' is that each part of the Empire should remain an in-
dependent fiscal unit, and levy such duties for revenue or protection as may !=cm good
to it, but should relax them in part in favor of the rcst of the Empire, thus taxing forei-n
goods on a higher scale than British goods." Chiozza-Money, Through Preference To
Protection 5 (1903).
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against the United States, 9 but have been unwilling to make the nec-
essary concessions to make this realistically possible.10
It may also be desirable to explore with our allies further permanent
measures to assist in adjusting balances of international payments in
cases where differences in domestic policies or other factors create a
serious imbalance. The International Bank and Monetary Fund are
partial answers to this problem, but a reappraisal of some of the ideas
which led to the creation of these institutions in the light of subsequent
experience may shed light on desirable improvements.0
Another problem concerning efforts looking toward the fullest use of
resources is the possible aggravation of any tendency toward domestic
inflation. But measures to deal with idleness in specific industries due to
trade liberalization, technical advance, or similar causes would not likely
be so large as to affect general price levels; the inflation issue is more
relevant in considering massive measures to offset overall business fluc-
tuations when they occur. We therefore turn to specific measures which
have been suggested to promote the fullest use of resources and as al-
ternatives to protection, including those recommended in proposals for
aid limited to the victims of tariff cuts.
III. SPECIFIC MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE
THE FULLEST USE OF RESOURCES
Almost all of the bewildering variety of proposals to deal with eco-
nomic injury involve assistance to producers facing economic injury, aid
to depressed communities, aid to displaced workers, or measures to aid
entire industries and promote growth in the economy as a whole, or
combinations of these.
Some of the criteria which may be used in judging these proposals
are:
1. How effective can they be in combatting injury?
2. Will they encourage economic growth or restrict it?
3. Will they stand up under the inevitable political pressures to alter
their objectives in order to protect particular groups at the expense of
the public?
4. Are they in accord with the tradition in our country of the type
of action proposed, which may help to give us experience and guideposts
for making them work and for judging their effectiveness?
89. See Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy 12-23, 42-53, 107-09, 150-54, 158-61, 192-
207 (1956).
90. See, e.g., id. at 151.
91. Id. passim. See Bronz, Book Review, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 451 (1957); Gardner,
Strategy for the Dollar, 38 Foreign Affairs 433, 434-35 (1960).
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This last test is particularly important because where a tradition has
already been established for a particular kind of action, public under-
standing is most readily obtained,-2 politically inspired efforts to divert
efforts from the basic purposes may be most readily combatted, and
there is likely to be a pool of experts with experience in the detailed
problems that will arise.
A. Assistance to Producers Facing Economic Injury
1. Technical Advice
The Federal Government has long supplied technical advice to farmers
through the Agricultural Extension Service,"3 and provision has also been
made for additional advice to farmers in depressed farm areas." Re-
search assistance for small business has similarly been authorized. 3 It
would be only a small step to make such assistance available wherever
idle resources impede economic progress, to assist producers in increasing
efficiency, finding new uses for products or services, or converting re-
sources to uses for which greater need exists."
2. Credit
Governmental loans or assistance in private loans are already common
under the FILA and small business investment program.57  However, in-
discriminate use of governmental credits is undesirable, because their
use may not in every case advance the goals of the program in question,
and may even aid producers to remain in a depressed industry rather
than to convert to new products or services. Hence, adjustment assist-
ance loans should be limited to those needed to carry out changes rec-
92. See Drucker, The Future of Industrial Alan, 263-65 (1942). Such reliance upon
Tradition does not mean that we should adopt new approachco, but rather that we chould
build wherever possible upon what has already been done. Progre:s is made in this
manner even in the physical sciences. Compare Einstein & Infeld, The Evolution of
Physics (193S). The same process is at work in legal decisions when it is rccoonizcd
that our experience under an existing legal rule has given it new content which demand-
recognition in the form of a reformation of the rule. See Blausktin & Field, "Ovcrruling"
Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 Mlich. L. Rev. 151, 174-75 (1953S).
93. 38 Stat. 372 (1914), as amended, 7 US.C. §§ 341-43 (195S) (extension program).
94. 69 StaL 6S3 (1955), 7 U.S.C. § 347a (195S).
95. 73 Stat. 647 (1959), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 636(d) (Supp. II, 1959-1910).
96. Cf. S. S51, S7th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1961); S. 3918, .6th Cong., 2d S=, § 10
(1960); S. 3664, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1953); S. 2907, 05th Cong., let S:c3. § 6 (1957);
Ruttenberg ' Seidman, Trade Adjustment Program, Committee for a National Trada
Policy, Conference on Trade Policy 3 (1960) (Round Table 'No. 5). But see Clubb &
Reischer, The Trade Adjustment Bills: Their Purpoze 1, Efficacy, 61 Colum. L, Rev.
490, 500 (1961).
97. Small Business Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 235, as amended, 15 U.,.C. § 636 (1953) (Supp.
II, 1959-1960); Cf. H.R. 1067, S6th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
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ommended under the technical assistance program or to convert facili-
ties to new uses where a clear need is shown to meet economic injury. 8
3. Tax Benefits
One of the most frequently advanced99 suggestions for aid to the vic-
tims of tariff cuts has been accelerated depreciation or some other form
of tax relief. A partial adjustment mechanism is already built into the
federal income tax because a decline in income of a firm is reflected in a
lower tax. However, special tax relief as a means of combatting eco-
nomic injury has the disadvantage that those firms which have no net
income and therefore are particularly in need of assistance will have no
tax to pay and thus be unable to benefit from tax relief except where it
can be offset against tax liability for other years. 00 Furthermore, tax
benefits not conditioned upon any transitional effort might actually at-
tract new industry into a field although conversion of resources from it
to other fields was desired. Tax benefits conditioned upon conversion, on
the other hand, would open a new field for tax administration, tax litiga-
tion, and statutory elaboration.
In addition to estimating the possible effectiveness of special tax
benefits in combatting economic injury, we must weigh considerations
of tax policy. Widespread use of special tax benefits to aid particular
groups has tended to subvert the uniformity, fairness, workability, and
predictability of the tax system.' The bewildering array of special
tax provisions enacted by Congress has already made the Internal
Revenue Code a labyrinth of exceptions and special rules for special
groups, frequently characterized as "loopholes" by those who do not
fall within them. The disadvantages of further complicating the tax
system through additional special provisions would seem to outweigh
98. See note 94 supra. See also S. 851, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 7, 8 (1961); S. 3918,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1960) ; S. 2907, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1957) ; Randall Report,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 56.
99. S. 851, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1961); S. 3918, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 8
(1960) ; S. 1609, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1959) ; S. 3664, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1958) ;
S. 2907, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1957); Ruttenberg & Seidman, Trade Adjustment
Program, Committee for a National Trade Policy, Conference on Trade Policy 3 (1960).
100. E.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 172(b); See Clubb & Reischer, The Trade Ad-
justment Bills: Their Purpose & Efficacy, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 490, 502 (1961).
101. See Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the
Departing Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 745 (1955); Surrey, The Federal
Income Tax Base for Individuals, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 815 (1958); Surrey, The Congress
and The Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 Harv. L. Rev, 1145
(1957); cf. Cary, Reflections Upon the American Law Institute Tax Project and the
Internal Revenue Code: A Plea for a Moratorium and Reappraisal, 60 Colum. L. Rev.
259 (1960) ; Paul, Erosion of the Tax Base and Rate Structure, 11 Tax L. Rev. 203 (1956).
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any advantages which special tax relief might have as a device for
dealing with economic injury. What appears to be needed is study of
the tax structure as a whole to deternmine how it can best promote a
healthy economy- '2 rather than the insertion of still further special
provisions to benefit the victims of tariff cuts or other economic injury.
4. Antitrust Exemptions Versus Antitrust Applicability
While Senator Javits' 1958 trade adjustment bill'0 3 included a pro-
vision for exemption from the antitrust laws of activities approved by
the Federal Trade Commission in connection with adjustments to
reductions of trade barriers, his 1960104 and 19 61i15 bills omit this pro-
vision, which was never included in the Kennedy proposal.',
Departure from antitrust principles in cases of economic injury has
been a controversial issue ever since the enactment of the Sherman Act in
1890.107 The antitrust laws are essentially a safeguard against private
measures for "protectionism" in its broad connotation. Since demands for
protection in its myriad forms are greatest where economic injury is se-
vere, it is not surprising that decisions and enactments departing from
antitrust objectives have been most frequent during periods of economic
hardship.lOs In addition, in part at least because of the political influence
of producers who concentrate their attention upon the treatment of a
particular industry, there has been a steady chipping away at the anti-
trust laws through innumerable special exemptions, 3 which taken to-
gether threaten a serious weakening of these laws." Exemptions are
102. See Message of the President, April 20, 1961, H. Doc. 140, 37th Cong., lt Secs,
107 Cong. Rec. 5992 (1961) (embodying many varied proposals); Federal Tax Policy for
Economic Growth and Stability, Report Prepared by the Subcommittee on Tax Policy
of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, S4th Cong., let Sezs. (1955).
103. S. 3664, S5th Cong., 2d Sees. § 2 (1953).
104. S. 3918, S6th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
105. S. S51, S7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
106. S. 2907, S5th Cong., lst Sees. (1957).
107. Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1390, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. f§ 1-7
(1958). Compare Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United State:, 223 U.S. 344 (1933) and
National Ass'n. of Vindow Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403 (1923), with
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (11940) and Fashion Originator3'
Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
I08. E.g., the National Industrial Recovery Act, 4S Stat. 195 (1933), held uniontitu-
tional in A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); cf. Rowe,
The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Pervpcctive, 57 Colum. L.
Rev. 1059 (1957).
109. See Note, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 679-SI (1953) for a partial listing of come major
exemptions.
110. This weakening has been offset in part by the cxtension of antitrust applicability
arising from expansion of the federal commerce power, and by some internal improvements
in the antitrust laws themselves. See id. at 675-77 and cases cited.
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sought chiefly either where restrictive practices constituting "protec-
tionism" in its broad sense are contemplated, or where a comprehensive
regulatory scheme is adopted which may replace to some extent"' the
protection of consumer interests otherwise provided by the antitrust
laws. In searching for an alternative to protectionism, antitrust exemp-
tions should be carefully weighed to determine in each case whether they
are actually necessary.
A provision exempting activities which are approved by a govern-
mental body can in practical operation result in a severe lessening of the
effect of the antitrust laws even where such approval is not granted.
This is so because the courts have held that an agency possessing
exemption power acquires primary jurisdiction to pass initially upon
issues affecting the subject matter in order that inconsistent decisions
may be minimized and the advantages of agency expertise be obtained. 12
There may also be some danger that agencies dealing with a particular
industry or type of problem may tend to be particularly influenced
by those whom they regulate and unduly sensitive to the political
pressures of such groups." 3 Judicial review is a safeguard against this
danger," 4 but only a partial one because of the great weight normally
given to agency decisions brought up for review." 5
111. See id. at 677-79. But cf. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Proc-
ess: A Reevaluation, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1119-27 (1954); Schwartz, Legal Restriction
of Competition in Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 Harv.
L. Rev. 436 (1954).
112. See Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its Rationalizations, 65 Yale
L.J. 315 (1956); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 577 (1954); von Mehren, The Anti-Trust Laws and Regulated Industries: The
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 929 (1954); Note, 58 Colum. L, Rev.
673, 689-94 (1958). The courts reason that where practices attacked in an antitrust suit
could have been approved by an agency (even though they have not been) the matter
must be referred to the agency to give it the opportunity to approve, if it wishes to do so,
before the antitrust claim may be adjudicated. Far East Conference v. United States,
342 U.S. 570 (1952). Thus practices prohibited by the antitrust laws may be effectively
instituted without securing agency approval and then submitted to the agency only later
if and when questioned. See 342 U.S. at 578-79 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
113. See Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation,
67 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1119-27 (1954).
114. See Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958); ef. Note, 58
Colum. L. Rev. 673, 694-98 (1958); Note, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 803, 812-13 (1959).
115. The force of this rule may be lessened as to findings of fact where the reviewing
court considers the alleged findings to be only conclusions drawn from undisputed or clear
underlying facts. E.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 562 (1958) ; Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 50-54 (1949); March v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); ilby v. Folsom,
238 F.2d 699, 700 (3rd Cir. 1956); Philber Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 129
(3rd Cir. 1956); Mars, Inc. v. Chubrilo, 216 Wis. 313, 257 N.W. 157 (1934); Cf. Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
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For these reasons it would not appear that antitrust exemptions offer
advantages sufficient to outweigh the detriment to antitrust objectives
which would necessarily result. On the contrary, the antitrust laws
could play an even more important part than they now do in encourag-
ing economic growth by limiting restrictive practices if fewer special
exemptions and exceptions had been carved out. Perhaps greater
utilization of the inherent flexibility of the antitrust laws to take account
of special circumstances and regulatory needs within the antitrust frame-
work itself would lessen the pressure for outright exemptions, and thus
help to permit greater effectiveness of the antitrust laws in encouraging
economic growth.3'0
The most useful forms of aid to producers to combat economic injury
and idle resources would thus appear to be technical advice and closely
supervised credit assistance. Tax benefits and antitrust exemptions
have been widely used to assist special groups, but experience indicates
the undesirability of these methods if the tax and antitrust laws them-
selves are to be fair and effective within their own spheres. Producers
may also be assisted, however, by measures designed to benefit com-
munities, entire industries, and the economy as a whole.
B. Aid to Depressed Comnities
Economic injury due to many causes has been frequently concentrated
in particular communities. 1 7  With this in mind, Congress in 1961
enacted the Area Development Act,"'8 a comprehensive scheme for
assistance to geographical areas suffering from chronic unemployment;
including credit for public facilities and for private projects important
to economic development,"8 technical assistance,12" urban renewal,12
and occupational training.'2 The occupational training provisions of the
act authorize use of federal funds to provide educational facilities or
services needed to meet training and retraining needs in geographical
areas of unusually high persistent levels of unemployment.123 Funds
may also be made available through the states for weeldy subsistence
payments to those undergoing occupational training under the act up
116. Note, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 6S1-S3 (195S); cf. R. A. Givcns, Paralli Buzin=ac
Conduct Under the Sherman Act, 5 Antitrust Bull. 273, 204-92 (190).
117. E.g., Compendium, op. cit. supra note 1, at 223. (injury due to import barrier
reduction); Kennedy, New England and the South, The Struggle for Indufiry 193 At-
lantic Monthly 32 (1954) (changes in location of industry).
118. 75 Stat. 47 (1961); see note SO supra.
119. Area Redevelopment Act § 7, 75 Stat. 47 (1961).
120. Area Redevelopment Act § 11, 75 Stat. 47 (1961).
121. Area Redevelopment Act § 14, 75 Stat. 47 (1961).
122. Area Redevelopment Act § 16, 75 Stat. 47 (1961).
123. Area Redevelopment Act § 17, 75 Stat. 47 (1961).
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to a limit of sixteen weeks, the weekly payment to be equal to the
average weekly unemployment compensation payment under the state
unemployment compensation system. 24
C. Aid to Displaced Workers
1. Retraining
Training in new skills for employees displaced by technical advance,1"
trade liberalization, 26 or other economic changes is a most effective
way not only to overcome the injury to them, but also to help the
nation regain the benefit of their productive effort. Although retraining
cannot restore the position of one who has worked at a trade for the
greater part of a lifetime and accumulated valuable seniority and pen-
124. Ibid.
125. See authorities cited note 13 supra; Levitan, Structural Unemployment and Public
Policy, 12 Labor L. J. 573, 579 (1961). On August 23, 1961 the Senate passed S. 1991,
the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1961. 153 Cong. Rec. 15704-09 (daily
ed. Aug. 23, 1961). As passed by the Senate, the bill provides for a four-year program
of federal aid for retraining for unemployed and underemployed persons regardless of the
cause of distress. See S. Rep. No. 651, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The Statement of
Findings and Purpose recognizes: "The Congress further finds that the skills of many
persons have been rendered obsolete by dislocations in the economy arising from auto-
marion or other technological developments, foreign competition, relocation of Industry,
shifts in market demands, and other changes in the structure of the economy; ... that It
is in the national interest that the opportunity to acquire new skills be afforded . . . In
order to alleviate the hardships of unemployment, reduce the costs of unemployment
compensation and public assistance, and to increase the Nation's productivity and Its
capacity to meet the requirements of the space age ... "
President Kennedy, in a message of May 29, 1961 recommending retraining legislation,
stated: "The unemployed whose skills have been rendered obsolete by automation and
other technological changes must be equipped with new skills enabling them to become
productive members of our society once again. The skills of other workers must also be
improved to enable them to meet the more demanding requirements of modern industry."
N.Y. Times, May 30, 1961, p. 14, col. 3. See also President's Advisory Committee on Labor
Management Policy, Statement on Automation, 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. (48 L.R.R.M.) 48, 49
ff 4(c) (1961); Impact of Automation, Report of the Subcommittee on Unemployment
and the Impact of Automation, House Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 20 (Comm. Print 1961); Senate Subcommittee Report, summarized in 1 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (48 L.R.R.M.) 313 (1961); cf. Business Week, May 11, 1961, p. 161. On the
uses of vocational training as part of the program for assisting depressed areas, see S.
Rep. No. 61, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1961).
126. E.g., S. 851, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13 (1961); S. 2907, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9
(1957); Lindeman & Salant, op. cit. supra note 8, at 259; Ruttenberg, in Compendium,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 787; Randall Staff Papers, op. cit. supra note 8, at 393; Rutten-
berg & Seidman, Trade Adjustment Program, Committee for a National Trade Policy, Con-
ference on Trade Policy 3 (1960) (Round Table No. 5); Vernon, A Trade Policy for the
1960s, 39 Foreign Affairs 458, 462 (1961).
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sion rights over many years, the opportunity to learn a new skill is the
most important single measure to assist displaced workers.
Federal aid for education, whenever considered vital to the national
interest, has a long tradition, beginning with college land grants'-" and
continuing through the assistance to vocational education since 1917,123
the "G.I. bill" providing educational assistance to veterans,'2 3 and
most recently, the National Defense Education Act-" of 1958. In
addition there have been proposals for wider aid to education, one of
which was passed by the Senate in 1961.111 Another major step in this
direction was made by the Area Redevelopment Act. "' This, however,
only deals with limited geographical areas.
Expansion of vocational education assistance and subsistence pay-
ments available to qualified students taking courses in skills vital to
the national effort, would permit displaced workers, regardless of geo-
graphical area, to learn new skills and thus make a greater contribution
to our economic growth. Because of the great need for highly skilled
workers for our economic development and for the automated industries
of the future,'33 it may be wise not to limit eligibility to those who can
show that they have been displaced. Such a limitation would create
severe dissatisfaction because a displaced worker able to take advantage
of training opportunities might actually be better off than his neighbor
who was not displaced and therefore ineligible. The employee denied
training opportunities because he was "not fortunate enough to be dis-
placed" would not readily be reconciled to the justice of any such distinc-
tion. Certainly an eligibility limitation based upon a single cause of dislo-
cation would be unwise as well as discriminatory and extremely difficult
to administer impartially. Although its cost would be greater, a program
without any eligibility limitation at all based on displacement would
127. 12 Stat. 503 (1362), as amended, 7 US.C. §§ 301-40 (1953) (Supp. II, 1959-1963)
123. Smith-Hughes Act, 39 Stat. 929 (1917), amended by 60 Stat. 775 (1946), as
amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 11-34 (195S) (Supp. II, 1959-1960); McCarthy, Vocational Educa-
tion, America's Greatest Resource 17-107 (1950).
129. See, e.g., 72 Stat. 1176 (195S), as amended, 3S I.S.C. §§ 101-169 (1953) (Supp.
II, 1959-1960).
130. National Defense Education Act of 1953, 72 Stat. ISI, 20 U.S.C. J 491.5,9
(1953) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
131. See S. 1021, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
132. See notes 122-24 supra.
133. See Automation and Technological Change: Hearinp and Rcport of the Sub-
committee on Economic Stabilization, Joint Committee on the Economic Rcport, Sth Cong.,
1st Sess. (1955); Morse, Promise and Peril of Automation, N.Y. Timcz, June 9, 1957,
§ 6 (Magazine), p. 15; cf. Kinker, Automation and Vocational Education, 46 Induztral
Arts and Vocational Education 175 (June 1957).
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make the maximum contribution to our resources of skilled manpower
and at the same time help to relieve the consequences of displacement.
Perhaps a compromise might give some preference to displaced workers
who were otherwise qualified without making evidence of displacement
an absolute requirement.
The Senate, in passing the proposed Manpower Development and Retraining Act on
August 23, 1961, did not limit retraining eligibility to the displaced or unemployed,
but merely provided for priority for the unemployed; the Senate-passed bill further
provides for subsistence payments for trainees, but here the bulk of payments must
be to unemployed workers with more than three years job experience.13 4
The chief requirement for scholarship grants should thus be a good
faith effort to learn a new skill which is of importance to national
purposes, adequate progress in the studies undertaken, and some limita-
tion on the length of time an individual could continue to receive benefits.
Such an'investment in new skills need not be limited to what has tradi-
tionally been known as vocational education, but could be linked with
any over-all federal scholarship program for academic students, so that
professions vital to our position in the world as well as various skilled
trades would benefit.
One drawback to such a program would of course be the cost to the
Treasury. However, our present federal contribution to education is
far less than at the peak of benefits paid under the "G.I. bill" follow-
ing World War II, 1"r and it may be questioned in view of the posture
of today's world whether it might not have been wiser to have main-
tained the post-World War II tempo.
Any vocational education program should also seek to take advan-
tage of the extent to which on-the-job training in industry already sup-
plements our formal educational system.' The possibilities providing
for the training of displaced workers through collective bargaining
arrangements' 17 should also be carefully considered by employers and
unions.
134. See 153 Cong. Rec. 15578-80 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1961) ; id. 15688-98, 15704-09 (daily
ed. Aug. 23, 1961); S. Rep. No. 651, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
135. See U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 135 (1958).
136. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1959, p. 21, col. 3; id., Feb. 5, 1959, p. 30, col. 3; Compare
American Council on Education, Matching Youth and Jobs 39-68 (1940), with Kinker,
Automation and Vocational Education, 46 Industrial Arts and Vocational Education 175
(June 1957).
137. See Fanning, The Challenge of Automation in the Light of the Natural Law,
11 Lab. L. J. 875, 878-79 (1960); N.Y. Times, April 5, 1960, p. 36, col. 2; Business Week,
May 11, 1957, p. 161; cf. 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. (48 L.R.R.M.) 249 (1961).
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2. Unemployment Compensation
The federally sponsored structure of state unemployment compen-
sation systems 35 constitutes an historic effort to deal with involuntary
employee idleness. Because of the inadequacy of benefit periods in the
face of prolonged or widespread idleness, however, Congress saw fit to
provide special additional unemployment compensation benefits for
veterans eligible for "G.I. bill" assistance, and to those displaced during
the 1958 recession under an option available to the states.'2 9 A some-
what similar procedure was again enacted in 1961.11 Special provisions
for those idle due to particular causes of dislocation such as reductions
of import barriers 11 have been suggested, but would create great dif-
ficulties in determining eligibility, 4 2 and would undoubtedly lead to the
dissatisfaction of those denied benefits.4 3 The alternative is to seek
continued strengthening of the basic unemployment insurance structure
rather than special provisions limited to particular groups.
Many unions and employers have sought to deal with inadequacies in
state compensation plans by adopting supplemental unemployment
benefit systems through collective bargaining. A controversy over
whether these benefits constitute "wages," which bar state benefits, has
arisen in many states, with most of them tending to hold that state
benefits still are available. 44 In seeking to strengthen the unemploy-
ment compensation structure, some solution to this problem should be
sought. A federal solution would be desirable since the collective
bargaining relationships which will be encouraged or discouraged in
this field are nationwide in scope. This would not constitute a serious
133. See 72 Stat. 171 (1953), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 14C0-14CDh (1953) (Supp. II, 1959-
1960).
139. 72 Stat. 1217 (1953), as amended, 3S U.S.C. §§ 201-14 (1953) (Supp. rI, 1959-
1960).
140. See 75 Stat. 3 (1961).
141. See S. S51, 37th Cong., lst Sezs. § 11 (1961); S. 3913, E6th Cong., 2d Sc:. § 11
(1960); Randall Staff Papers, op. cit. supra note 3, at 392; Ruttenbzrg, in Compendium,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 792; Ruttenberg & Seidman, Trade Adjustment Program, Com-
mittee for a National Trade Policy, Conference on Trade Policy 3 (1960) (Round Table
No. 5).
142. Cf. Vrecox, Relief for the Victims of Tariff Cuts, 40 Am. Econ. Rev. S24, 325-S9
(1950). These difficulties need not exist where a private plan for compensating employccs
due to economic injury can be tailored to the particular circumstances. See N.Y. Time:,
June 30, 1960, p. 62, coL 1.
143. Considerable problems concerning eligibility arise under existing Etate plans as to
the cause of idleness. See, e.g., Note, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 209 t1959).
144. See Chernick & Naef, Legal and Political Asp~cts of the Integratien of Unemploy-
ment Insurance and SUB Plans, 12 Ind. & Lab. Rd. Rev. 20 (1953), and case5 cited; Fan-
ning, The Challenge of Automation in the Light of the Natural Law, 11 Lab. L. J. S75,
880-S1 (1960).
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invasion of state autonomy, since there are already basic federal require-
ments which state plans must meet to avoid the application of a federal
payroll tax on employers within the state.14 5 To allow state and private
unemployment benefits to supplement each other would encourage em-
ployers and unions to develop private plans for mitigating the effects
of idleness. 4 '
Integration of private and state plans, however, cannot be a sub-
stitute for improvement in the state plans themselves, because most
employees are not covered by private plans. The chief needs for im-
provement in state plans concern the amount of benefits and the length
of the period during which benefits are available.' 47
3. Fairness to Older Workers
Since an older worker who is displaced may face heartbreaking dif-
ficulties in beginning a new career,'48 various forms of assistance have
been suggested. Acceleration of Social Security retirement benefits has
been proposed as one way to aid such workers. 40 However, to grant
such benefits to a "displaced" group, or worse yet to a group found to
have been displaced due to a single cause, while denying them to others
would certainly create severe dissatisfaction. An alternative approach
is renewed efforts to promote more jobs for older workers. New York
has attempted to expand job opportunities for older workers by an
Age Discrimination Law' 50 making certain types of age discrimination
in employment illegal. The workability of the Law may be questioned,
however, because as the statute recognizes,'' age discrimination may be
justified for some kinds of work, and because such discrimination may
145. The constitutionality of the interlocking federal-state unemployment insurance
structure was upheld in Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
146. E.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1960, p. 1, cols. 1, 2.
147. Cf. Randall Staff Papers, op. cit. supra note 8, at 397; Economic Report of the
President 40 (1959) (option of aid to states to lengthen benefits in 1958 recession).
148. Skills are the most important safeguard against poverty in old age, but may be
hard to acquire anew when an older worker is displaced. See generally A.M. & J.N. Ross,
Employment Problems of Older Workers, in U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on
Unemployment Problems, Studies in Unemployment 97 (1960); M. B. Givens, Prevention
of Poverty in Old Age, in Good News for Later Life, Report of the N.Y. State Joint
Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging 59-62 (1958).
149. See S. 851, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1961); S. 3918, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12
(1960); Ruttenberg, in Compendium 792, op. cit. supra note 1; Ruttenberg & Seidman,
Trade Adjustment Program, in Committee for a National Trade Policy, Conference on
Trade Policy 3 (1960) (Round Table No. 5); Clubb & Reischer, The Trade Adjustment
Bills: Their Purpose and Efficacy, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 490, 499 (1961).
150. N.Y. Executive Law § 296; see Comment, Age Discrimination in Employment:
Legislative and Collective Bargaining Solutions, 53 Nw. U. L. Rev. 96 (1958).
151. N.Y. Executive Law § 296(1)(c).
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prove extremely difficult to detect in practice. It would appear that
seeking voluntary cooperation on the part of employers may be the
most fruitful approach in working to expand employment opportunities.
Another serious problem for the displaced older worker is the loss
of seniority and pension rights which may have taken years to accumu-
late.aa In industries where industry-wide collective bargaining is prac-
ticed, employers and unions should seriously consider the impact upon
the older worker of loss of accumulated pension rights, and the prac-
ticability of granting earlier vesting of the right to benefits based upon
the number of years worked prior to layoff. This would make it pos-
sible for a displaced employee to receive at least some retirement
benefits even though not the normal full amount. A partial step in this
direction may be taken where several employers pool their pension
systems so that at least under certain conditions work for any of them
is credited to the employee.Y-3 If private action does not solve this
problem,""4 it may be that state or federal legislation to encourage
earlier vesting through tax incentives": should be considered. Tax ad-
vantages for pension and welfare funds are already provided by the
Internal Revenue Code, and the question would be only whether these
requirements should encourage earlier vesting under qualified employee
retirement plans.Y;
152. See Randall Staff Papers, op. cit. supra note S, at 393; cf. Porter, Job Propzrty
Rights 76 (1954); Tilove, Pension Funds and Economic Freedom 20-2S (1959) (A Report
to the Fund for the Republic); Brissenden, Labor Mobility and Employee Bencfit', 6 Lab.
L. J. 762 (1955).
153. This may be an ultimate outgrowth of the tendency toward uniform collective
bargaining provisions under industry-wide bargaining. Goldner, Area Penzion Plan3 Under
Collective Bargaining, 3 Lab. L. J. 825 (1952); White, Pension Plans in Labor Agree-
ments v. Older Workers, 12 Lab. L. J. 32, 50, SS (1960); ef. Goodman, Multicmployer
Pension, Profit-Sharing and Stock Bonus Plans, 11 Lab. L. J. 1103 (1670); Pollah,
Social Implications of Industry-Wide Bargaining (194S).
154. On employee rights concerning pension plans and changes in them, ree generally
Issacson, Employee Welfare and Pension Plans: Regulation and Protection of Employee
Rights, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 96 (1959); Note, Protection of Beneficiaries Under Employee
Benefit Plans, 5S Colum. L. Rev. 73 (195S); Note, Contractual Aspects of Penion Plan
Mlodification, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 251 (1956).
155. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401; Note, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 78, 93-99 (19M);
Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 490 (1957).
156. Where a deferred compensation plan is not "qualified" under Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 401, until recently the tax law actually encouraged delay in vesting, bzcauc2 if
the future payments were contingent, they would be less likely to be considered the equlva-
lent of cash and thus taxable as "constructively received" prior to actual receipt. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1957); Renton r. Brodie, 1 T.C. 275 (1942) (paymcnt to third
party for employee's benefit the equivalent of cash). However, under Rev. RuL CO-31,
1960-1961 Int. Rev. Bull. at 174, it is indicated that it is no longer necec:ary that future
payments be made contingent in order to avoid constructive receipt, if there are no payments
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4. Moving Allowances and the Rights of Nonresidents
Allowances to help workers to move to new locations have been sug-
gested as a further means of combating unemployment in depressed
areas.117 However, to move may uproot old associations without guaran-
teeing success in the new location. Although the widespread mobility of
many families today has been claimed to be healthy in the long run,
158
artificial encouragement of moving might accentuate social problems
created by large-scale migration, such as interruption of education for
the migrants' children" 9 and overcrowding of community facilities in
areas to which moving occurs.160 If hoped-for job prospects do not
materialize after a move, disappointment is bound to be intense, and
there would undoubtedly be demands for further governmental assistance
for those stranded at an undesirable location. Further, some groups
might be quite unwilling to move.16' There are, however, measures short
of the actual granting of moving allowances to depressed areas which
could assist those willing to move in search of better opportunities.
At present, far from granting allowances to those willing to move,
we actually discriminate against them in many ways. Although the
Supreme Court has held that it is an unconstitutional interference with
interstate commerce for a state to attempt to bar migration from other
states, 62 states and localities have many practices designed to dis-
courage the entrance of poor persons. 63 Eligibility for relief and other
to a third party for the benefit of the employee and the deferment of payment is binding
upon the employee and agreed upon either in arm's-length bargaining for sound business
reasons or before the work involved is done. But see Wood, Contingencies May Still Be
a Good Idea in Deferred Compensation Contracts, 12 J. Taxation 210 (1960); Revenue
Rulings have on occasion been retroactively revoked. See Automobile 'Club of Michigan
v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957). Consequently tax reasons may continue to encourage
delays in vesting which are not otherwise economically desirable.
157. S. 851, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1961) ; S. 3918, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13 (1960);
S. 2907, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1957); Randall Staff Papers, op. cit. supra note 8, at
393; Ruttenberg, in Compendium 792, op. cit supra note 1; Ruttenberg & Seidman, Trade
Adjustment Program, Committee for a National Trade Policy, Conference of Trade Policy
3 (1960) (Round Table No. 5). Moving allowances were, however, rejected by a Senate
Labor Subcommittee in June 1961. See 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. (48 L.R.R.M.) 313 (1961).
158. See Schorr, Families on Wheels, 216 Harpers 71, 78 (January, 1958).
159. See Interstate Migration, H. Rep. No. 369, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30, 53 (1941);
Barclay, Children on the Move, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1960 § 6 (Magazine), p. 80; Barclay,
Child in a New Neighborhood, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1958 § 6 (Magazine), p. 53; 39 School
Life 4 (Jan. 1957) (one out of five children move in the course of a year).
160. See Kerr, Migration to the Seattle Labor Market Area 1940-1942, 11 U. of Wash.
Publication in the Social Sciences 129, 164 (1942).
161. Cf. Florinsky, Integrated Europe 68-69 (1955).
162. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
163. Interstate Migration, H. Rep. No. 369, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 622-35 (1941) ; cf.
id. at 635-48.
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benefits as well as the franchise are widely restricted on the basis of
length of residence.'"4 Also the federal income tax laws discriminate
against persons moving to seek new jobs. The transportation of machin-
ery to a new location is deductible as a business e:xpense,'-5 but if an
employee spends his own funds to travel to the new location of his job
or to seek or accept a new job he receives no such deduction or ex-
clusion from taxable income.00  Before considering such a step as the
granting of moving allowances we would do well to reconsider the
merits of the discrimination we still practice against those who pick up
stakes and seek opportunities in new locations. If a moving allowance
program is adopted, it will be vital to assure that new jobs, adequate
housing and other facilities are available at the new location before
moves are encouraged.
Thus retraining programs appear to offer the most attractive avenue
for assisting displaced employees. Other available means of mitigating
injury to displaced employees would include closer integration of un-
employment insurance and supplemental unemployment benefit plans,
earlier vesting of benefits under employee retirement plans, and lessen-
ing of discrimination against employees who move in search of better
opportunities.
D. 21easres to Aid Entire Industries and to Promote Growth
in the Economy as a Whole
1. Research
Development of new uses for existing products and raw materials, and
of more efficient methods in existing industries can serve the dual
purposes of combatting injury to the industries affected'"7 and increas-
ing our economic potential.lcs Even more important, basic research
in the fundamental sciences where no immediate practical objective
may be in view can open up the way for the creation of entirely new
164. The concepts of residence and domicile are often highly indefinite in practice, thus
maling it difficult in some instances for the individual to predict what rights and obli.-a-
tions he is acquiring. See Reese, Does Domlcil Bear a Single Meaning?, 55 Colum. L. Rev.
589 (1955); Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 Vand. L. Rev. $61 (1953).
165. Fowler & Union Horse Nail Co., 16 B.T.A. 1071 (1929).
166. York v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1947); William C. Bycr, 14 CCH
Tax CL Mem. 153 (1955); Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 53.
167. Technological change is, of course, a cause of economic injury as well as a means
of treating it, f. note 13 supra, unless measures are taken to avoid that rult.
16S. Slichter, The Industry of Discovery, 12S Science 1610 (Dec. 22, 1953); cf. Pfeiffer,
The Basic Need for Basic Research, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1957, § 6 (Magazine), p. 23. For
one such proposed program, see Johnson, If We Could Take the Salt Out of Water,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1960, § 6 (Magazine), p. 17, col. 7.
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industries and methods.169 Federal assistance to research has grown
through efforts to meet military needs and through activities of civilian
agencies such as the National Science Foundation, 70 often by means
of contracts with industry and educational institutions. Further ex-
tension of such efforts, within the limitations of the skilled manpower
available, may be one of the most effective stimulants to economic
growth and a great aid to depressed industries.
2. Stockpiling
The United States has stockpiled strategic materials since 1939.171
The chief purpose has been to assure adequate supplies of critical
materials in the event of emergency, but another ever-present and
sometimes competing goal has been to aid industry by either stabilizing
or supporting market prices.1 72
A multiple-purpose stockpiling program can serve both to provide
a reserve of strategic materials available in case of emergency, and to
provide a buffer stock to even out fluctuations in output and price of
the materials concerned. 7 ' Materials which are not perishable and can
be cheaply stored without risk of deterioration, such as many metals and
metal ores, seem especially appropriate for stockpiling, although to date
it has been perishable farm products which have been stored in the
greatest quantities by the Government, under the farm price support
program.174
One of the great controversies which has surrounded strategic
materials stockpiling has been the extent to which domestic producers
should be given preference over foreign suppliers."" The Buy American
Act, 176 granting considerable preferences to domestic suppliers, applies
169. See N.Y. Times, March 24, 1959, p. 38, col. 5, as an instance of the growing rec-
ognition of our need for greater support for basic research.
170. National Science Foundation Act, 64 Stat. 149 (1950), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1861-79 (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
171. See 53 Stat. 811 (1939), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-98h (1958).
172. See Snyder, The Stockpiling of Strategic Materials 19-97, 253-57, 346-59 (1956)
(unpublished thesis in Columbia University, Butler Library); cf. Business Week, Sept. 17,
1955, p. 31.
173. See Knorr, Tin Under Control 295-98 (1945); Business Week, May 26, 1956,
p. 191; cf. id., Sept. 17, 1955, p. 31; Report of the President's Materials Policy Commission,
"Resources for Freedom" (1952).
174. 63 Stat. 1054 (1949), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421-68 (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
175. See, e.g., Snyder, The Stockpiling of Strategic Materials 253-57, 346-59 (1956)
(unpublished thesis in Columbia University, Butler Library); Hearings Before the House
Committee on Public Lands, on Stockpiling of Strategic and Critical Materials, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947).
176. 47 Stat. 1520 (1933), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ lOa-10c(1958).
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to our present stockpiling program,1 7 but the bulk of purchases have
nevertheless been made abroad 7 " because the materials stockpiled are
chiefly those expected to be unavailable domestically in case of emer-
gency. The result has been continuing political agitation ior greater
preferences for domestic producers 7 9
Preference for domestic producers may strengthen United States
productive capacity which may be important in case of emergency, but
may also tend to deplete domestic underground reserves of minerals, 0
and, of course, is frequently more expensive than purchases from the
cheapest available foreign source. Furthermore, preferences for domes-
tic suppliers tend to alienate politically the foreign nations from which
supplies are derived, thus undermining our strategic position and
jeopardizing future access to such sources."' Preferences also weaken
friendly nations economically, making them more susceptible to agitation
from the extreme left or right and at the same time forcing them to
seek other markets for their products anmong less friendly powers.
Purchases from domestic suppliers at higher than the world market
price also involve either the administratively difficult task of allocating
profitable high priced sales among domestic suppliers'12 or the creation
of a domestic price level above the world market price. This in turn
may lead to the necessity for import restrictions to protect the artificially
raised domestic price level from foreign competition. -3
Stockpiling giving effective preference to domestic suppliers is ac-
tually then a form of protection rather than part of an alternative to
protection. The protectionist aspect tends to result in a need for further
restrictions on the industry itself. In order to sustain a high-cost sub-
sidized domestic industry which has become dependent upon subsidy,
177. 53 Stat. 811 (1939), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § obia)t2)(1958). applying 47
Stat. 1520 (1933), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10c (1953) (Supp. II, 1959-190).
178. Hearings Before the House Committee on Public Lands, on Stockpiling of Stra-
tegic and Critical Materials, S0th Cong., 1st Sess. 65-66 (1947).
179. See note 175 supra.
180. Snyder, The Stockpiling of Strategic Materials 370 (1956) (unpublibcd thc in
Columbia University, Butler Library); see Paley, Resources for Freedom (1952) (Rcport
of President's Materials Policy Comm'n).
181. See N.Y. Times, March 22, 1959, §3, p. Fl, col. S; Paley, op. cit. supra note 110,
at 77; Snyder, op. cit. supra note 1SO at 379-37.
182. N.Y. Times, April 12, 1959, § 1, p. 22, col. 1 (oil import quotas); cf. note 175
supra.
1S3. E.g., the import curbs authorized and extensively used to protect the domeztic
farm price support program. See note 44 supra. Similarly, airline subsidies have lcrn uzcd
as an argument for ezcluding foreign competition lest business be divcrtcd from domt eic
carriers and thus increasing the Government's subsidy burdcn in supporting the domestic
firms. See N.Y. Times, April 18, 1959, p. 46, coL 5. The advrse effect on forcima rdatiuna
appears to be clear.
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and at the same time limit the financial cost of governmental support,
restrictions on production and limitations on entry tend ultimately to
become necessary. Then we have come full circle from an effort to
encourage *domestic production to the necessity of restricting it to
keep the cost to the government within bounds. Indications of the link
between subsidy and restriction can be seen in the acreage limitations
growing out of the farm program' and the limitations on entry im-
posed with varying intensity in the varyingly subsidized airline in-
dustry.' 85 These consequences, however, have only delayed immediate
impact upon those who are most directly concerned with the particular
industry, and are represented in our domestic political processes; hence
powerful pressures tend to promote ever increased preference for
domestic producers whenever governmental leaders fail to resist these
pressures in the longer-range interest of those concerned and of the
nation.
In the interest of our own long range security we should seek to use
our power to encourage stable and growing economies in friendly nations
throughout the world as well as at home. The stockpiling program
should be no exception. An enlarged multiple-purpose stockpiling pro-
gram with both strategic purposes and the economic objective of avoid-
ing unduly sharp fluctuations in the price of readily storeable commod-
ities, would both strengthen our reserves of critical materials in the
event of emergency and offer important advantages to industries at
home and in friendly nations by seeking to even out fluctuations in
demand and price. 86 The benefit to domestic industry from such buf-
fer stockpiling could best be enhanced, not by increased preferences,
but by including in the stockpile materials which have fluctuating
markets, can be stored cheaply and do not become obsolete. A workable
buffer stock program aimed at stabilizing the market would of course
contemplate the sale of buffer stocks whenever prices were higher than
normal, 87 as well as purchases when prices were lower.
184. For an extreme illustration, see the facts involved in Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942), unanimously followed in United States v. Haley, 358 U.S. 644 (1959).
185. E.g., Southern Service to the West, 12 C.A.B. 518, 532-34 (1951). On the signifl-
cance of freedom of entry, see Bain, Barriers to New Competition (1956) ; Edwards, Main-
taining -Competition 186-248 (1949); Stocking & Watkins, Cartels or Competition? 136.38
(1948).
186. An alternative method of promoting stabilization is to encourage or permit car-
tels, but their policies do not normally encourage economic growth. Cf. Pribram, Cartel
Problems (1935). Another possibility is to utilize comprehensive governmental control,
with its disadvantages. Cf. Knorr, Tin Under Control (1945).
187. See Knorr, op. cit. supra note 186, at 292.
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Important dangers are that buffer stocks will be viewed as a cure-all,9
that only purchases and never sales will be permitted,'" that protec-
tionism in the guise of preference for domestic suppliers will develop
under the inevitable political pressures which arise in connection with
such a program and that purchases to stabilize the market will displace
or undermine the program of purchases for strategic reserves rather
than complement the strategic stockpile.'01 If these dangers can be
overcome, a buffer stockpile in addition to a strategic stockpile offers
substantial benefits to free world markets and through them to domestic
producers as a vital element in these markets. It may thus contribute
to an alternative to protection by lessening economic injury through
evening out price fluctuations, and promoting the fullest use of our
resources through production for stockpile during slack periods or
recessions. 191
3. Defense Contracts
Our defense procurement, like the strategic reserve aspect of stock-
piling programs, must be based on national defense needs rather than
economic considerations. Nevertheless, whenever substantial unemploy-
ment occurs, acceleration of the procurement of items which will
strengthen our defenses would be wise if the items are needed, since
the human and physical resources thus put to work might otherwise
be idle and make no contribution to the national welfare. Also prefer-
ences in defense contract placement have been given to depressed areas
and depressed industries in many instances.' 2
Defense contracts can serve another important role in our search for
an alternative to protection because one basis for protection is the
desire to safeguard a domestic mobilization base for use in case of
emergency. "3 Such a mobilization base may be maintained, in large
13S. Id. at 295; Davis, New International Wheat Agreement, 19 Wheat Studic- of the
Food Research Institute 79 (Stanford University, 1942).
189. Current restrictions on dispositions are severe, and are appropriate to purely stra-
tegic, not buffer stock objectives. See 53 Stat. 312 (1939), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 92d
(195S); cf. N.Y. Times, April is, 1959, p. 29, col. 5.
190. See Snyder, The Stockpiling of Strategic Mlatcrials, 19-27, 253-57, 346-59 (1956)
(unpublished thesis in Columbia University, Butler Library).
191. Id. at 543. When demand for minerals is unusually low, threatening economic
injury, increased purchasing for stockpile can be a wry real alternative to protection.
See N.Y. Times, June 11, 195S, p. 49, col. 1; id., April 15, 195S, p. 1, cal. 6. But
producers may tend to prefer protection to either stodpiling or direct Eubidicz:. Sze
N.Y. Times, April 30, 195S, p. 45, col. 6. The position of the Palcy Report is that
buffer stockpiling should be org-anized on an international basis. Paky, Refources for
Freedom, 87-90 (1952) (Report of President's Materials Policy Comm'n). But cf. Knorr,
Tin Under Control (1945), for skepticism of such arran7,cmints.
192. E.g., Exec. Order No. 10532, 19 Fed. Reg. 3723 (1q54).
193. See notes 41-43 supra.
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part, by actual procurement of items needed for defense purposes
through defense contracts. For this reason there may be some justi-
fication for granting a preference to producers in the United States and
geographically contiguous areas, such as Canada, 194 from which sup-
plies would be available in case of emergency, where the products
purchased are highly essential and the industry concerned would other-
wise suffer serious injury. The Buy American Act of 1933, however,
gives considerable preference to U.S. suppliers of even non-essential
goods and services without any showing of actual or threatened injury. 9"
The act was, of course not originally enacted with defense considerations
primarily in mind, but rather with protection as a means to domestic
recovery in view. For defense purposes, producers in Canada should
be entitled to the same favorable treatment as those in the United States,
but the Buy American Act fails to provide for any such preference.
The great danger in recognizing the propriety of even limited
preferences for defense reasons is that political pressures for protec-
tion may cause preferences to be granted under color of national secu-
rity. Hence, preferences on defense grounds should be closely restricted
to highly essential industries which can clearly show immediate danger
of serious injury.
4. Transition Periods in Implementing Trade Liberalization as a
Substitute for the Escape Clause
The present "escape clause" 9 6 which looks toward revocation of any
trade concession seriously injuring domestic industry, and the "peril
point" provision' 97 seeking to prevent such concessions from ever being
made, are fundamentally inconsistent with the purposes of our foreign
policy since World War II. Our trade program still has the promotion
of domestic prosperity as one of its objectives; but the reasons for the
successive extensions of the Trade Agreements Act'99 and the aims
which can be inferred from its administration over a considerable
period make it clear that the real purposes are much broader. These
purposes include cooperating with friendly nations and improving their
economies as part of long range strategy to strenghten the free world
and build a just and lasting peace. 90 The peril point and escape clause
194. See N.Y. Times, May 1, 1959, p.], col. 71. When pertinent defense industries are
located there, Mexico might also be given appropriate preferences in cases where the
industry is near enough to the site of probable use of the product.
195. 47 Stat. 1520 (1933), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§10a-10d (1958).
196. 65 Stat. 73 (1951), as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1363-64 (1958).
197. 65 Stat. 72 (1951), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1360 (1958).
198. 48 Stat. 943 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1958).
199. See notes 46-50 supra.
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provisions in their present form are inconsistent with these objectives.
Yet it is reasonable that risks of injury to domestic industry should be
taken into account in timing the effectiveness of trade liberalizations.
For this purpose, it has been suggested that where serious injury
is expected or found by the Tariff Commission, the recommendation
should not be for the withdrawal of a concession or that one not be
granted, as under present law,200 but for a transition period in the
effectiveness of the concession, or for its temporary suspension during a
short and limited period to give time for adjustment.20 At the end of a
transition period during which the trade concession would be given
increasing effect (for example in steps of twenty-five per cent of its full
extent annually until the full concession is permanently in effect) no
further "escape" would be authorized. The device of a transition period
is provided for by the European Economic Community in the creation
of the Common Market '2 and merits serious consideration as a substi-
tute for the present peril point and escape clause provisions. Its effect
would be to soften the sudden impact of trade liberalizations upon
domestic producers at any given time, permitting them to plan ahead
in attempting to increase efficiency or convert to other products or
services, but without permitting the indefinite postponement of reduc-
tion of import barriers in the interest of protection.
5. A Self-Reinforcing Transition From Protectionism
Protectionism, in its broad sense, on behalf of a particular group
may benefit that group in the short run - 3 at the expense of consumers
and of economic growth. But even these benefits my be negated by
the effects of protection secured by other groups. Thus a particular
group may receive more because of a high tariff, an import quota, or
other form of protectionism, but at the same time be a victim of higher
costs imposed by other groups which have also secured one of the many
forms of protection against the forces of economic change. It is easier,
from a political point of view, to concentrate on securing protection for
20. See notes 196, 197 supra.
201. See Kindleberger, Imports, The Tariff, and the Ncd for Adjtutment, in Com-
pendium, op. it. supra note 1, at 73, S6; Teles, To Facilitate Adjustment to LiLcralizcd
Trade, in Committee for a National Trade Policy, Confcrence on Trade Policy (190)
(Round Table No. 5); Vernon, A Trade Policy for the ilQ '1 39 Fordgn Wf~air5 435
462 (1961).
202. Treaty Establishing the Europmn Economic Community, pt. 1, art. 0, 293
UN.T.S. 17 (1957).
203. It will benefit the group only until too many others are attracted into the fid unlma
a restriction on entry to "protect the protection" is secured and defended agaiwJ attsmpta
to overcome or dislodge it.
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one's own industry than to take an active interest in opposing each of
the myriad demands for special dispensations made by others. There-
fore strong leadership and political courage is required if we are to
begin to reduce the various forms of protectionism or even resist adding
new ones. It is necessary to educate the public so as to make it clear
that when everybody is restricting, economic growth is slower and there
is less for all.
But once a trend toward relaxing some of the barriers of protec-
tion is initiated it could prove self-reinforcing if vigorously pursued.
The lessening of protectionism favoring one group will benefit others,
who may then be more willing to give up special measures favoring
themselves. To this extent a transition from protectionism can itself
be an important part of a viable alternative to protection. This will
be possible, of course, only if other measures such as some of those
discussed above are also taken to deal with economic injury by promoting
the fullest use of resources. There are several areas in which the possi-
bilities of measures looking toward a lessening of restrictive features
might be considered." 4
a. Import Barriers
Not only our present tariff rates, but the escape clause and peril
point provisions,205 the Buy American Act,2°0 and import restrictions
stated (though not always accurately) to be based on national
security grounds, should be re-examined to determine whether their
benefits outweigh their disadvantages, including their interference with
our foreign policy objectives. Study might also be given to our farm
price support program to determine whether the restrictive and pro-
tectionist features could be lessened by seeking to make governmental
purchases serve additional purposes, such as in school lunch programs
and in relieving food shortages in developing areas of the world as a
contribution to their capital for development.
20 7
204. Cf. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1959, p. 21, col. 4.
205. 65 Stat. 73 (1951), as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1363-64 (1958) (escape clause); 65
Stat. 72 (1951), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1360 (1958) (peril point provision). See authori-
ties cited in note 201 supra on the proposal for a transitional period rather than with-
drawal of a concession as the recommendation to be made under the escape clause and
peril point provisions.
206. 47 Stat. 1520 (1933), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-
1960); see note 45 supra. The act might be limited to preferences in national security
cases as an alternative to its complete repeal.
207. If our farm productivity were utilized so that it became truly a national asset
rather than a liability, protection would appear less necessary.
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b. Restrictions on Entry, Service, and on Price Reductions in
Regulated Industries
Further study might be given to the extent to which competition and
regulation may be regarded as complementary means of safeguarding
the public interest rather than as antithetical or mutually exclusive. -Y3
c. Antitrust Exemptions
The myriad of special antitrust exceptions and exemptions, under
regulatory statutes and otherwise,2 -3 should be carefully reviewed, with
a view to making greater use where possible of the inherent flexibility
of the antitrust laws"'0 rather than of complete exclusions from their
coverage.
d. The Robinson-Patman Act
Study should be given as to whether or not price reductions due to
economies made possible by large-scale buying are discouraged under
the Robinson-Patman Act 21' because cost justifications of price dif-
ferences are too difficult to establish212  This should be done with a
view to developing amendments or interpretations of the act which will
reconcile it with the aims of other antitrust policies to the extent
possible..2 1 3
e. Fair Trade
The desirability and need for continuing to permit state-approved
retail price maintenance as an exception to the Sherman Act's ban on
203. See Dirlam & Stelzer, The Insurance Industry: A Case Study in the Wor a]bility
of Regulated Competition, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 199 (195); ef. R. A. Givens, Rfuz:1 of
Radio and Television Licenses on Economic Grounds, 46 Va. L. Rev. 1391 19r0);
Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Proccs: A Rczxaluation, 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 1105, 1119-27 (1954); Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Comp-,tition in the Rcguhtcd
Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 Hlarv. L. Rev. 436 (1954); Note,
53 Colum. L. Rev. 673 (1953); Note, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 1036 (1957).
209. For an abbreviated catalogue of a few of the major eaccption, sce Note, -3 Colum.
L. Rev. 673, 679-SO n.56 (1953).
210. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 203 U.S. 344, 359-0 (1933); Handlr,
Antitrust in Perspective 3-23 (1957); R. A. Givens, Parallcl Business Conduct Under the
Sherman Act, 5 Antitrust Bull. 273 (1960); Note, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 631-23 (1953).
211. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 US.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1953) (Supp. II,
1959-1960).
212. See Taggart, Cost Justification (1959); Rowe, Cost Justification of Price Differ-
entials Under The Robinson-Patman Act, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 5,4 (1959).
213. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 US. 231, 24S-51 (1951); Rowe, The Evolu-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Pcr.pective, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 1059
(1957). See also FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); Nashvilfu Ml Co. v.
Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, supra.
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price-fixing agreements2 14 should be reappraised, and a nationwide federal
fair trade act should not be passed.
f. State and Local Licensing and Regulatory Laws and
Building Codes
Many state laws restrict entry into widely differing fields in order
to protect health, safety, and quality standards, and sometimes also
with the objective of protecting those already in the regulated field from
outside competition, or to prefer local over out-of-state interests. With
the steady expansion of transportation facilities and the increasingly
interstate character of our economy,21 the commerce clause210 of the
federal constitution may well play an increasing role in the future in
limiting the restrictive features of state statutes. In passing upon the
validity of state statutes affecting interstate commerce, the underlying
policies of federal statutes are significant because Congress exercises
the ultimate authority over interstate commerce. 217  Therefore, the
federal antitrust laws and the national policy they declare should be
reflected in particularly close and careful scrutiny of state statutes
affecting interstate commerce which might interfere with these
objectives. 18
g. Restrictive Work Rules
If more effective measures for preventing unemployment and pro-
viding retraining for displaced workers were adopted, the unions
might be more willing to consider relinquishing restrictive practices
which are designed to safeguard jobs from the threat posed by tech-
nological advance. 19
214. Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
215. See note 14 supra.
216. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
217. See the discussion in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (Stone,
CJ.), acted upon in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). This ultimate
congressional control avoids the danger of unwise judicial invalidation of state action
which cannot be corrected by legislative action, present in the pre-1937 economic due
process cases, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Dowling, Interstate
Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 547 (1947).
218. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, supra note 217, at 764-65 (objectives of national
transportation policy); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 367-68 (1943) (purpose of fed-
eral farm program taken into account in sustaining state program); Buck v. Kuykendall,
267 U.S. 307 (1925)(federal highway aid objectives). Compare Stone, The Common
Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 12-13 (1936).
219. Existing public policies seeking to discourage "featherbedding" have met with
scant success. Section 8(b)(6) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935),
amended by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6)(Supp. II, 1959-
[Vol. 30
19611 AN ALTERNATIVE TO PROTECTIOX
The workability of lessening protectionism in any of these fields
depends upon both effective measures to lessen injury in particular
cases, and an overall economic climate of full utilization of resources.
It is essential both in dealing with economic injury in avoiding pro-
tectionism that a high level of economic activity be maintained, and
that severe depressions or mass unemployment be avoided. Although
1960), prohibiting attempts to secure payments "in the nature of an exaction, for -r:ziCC3
which are not performed or not to be performed" has been narrowly interpreted. XLRB
v. Gamble Enterprises, 345 U.S. 117 (1953); American Nevwcpaper PubLbecrs ,3n v.
NTLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (1953). A prohibition on make-work practices in broadeazting wmas
upheld in United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947), but, perhaps in view of the crimi-
nal penalties involved, was held to require knowledge that the worh involvcel was un-
necessary. United States v. Petrillo, 75 F. Supp. 176 (N.D. Ill. 104S). And in Order of
Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (19), the Court held that
a strike to force retention of unnecessary jobs was not illegal in such a way as to
permit it to be enjoined in spite of the Norris La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (195S). See generally the differing views cxprccc:d in Aaron, Governmental
Restraints on Featherbedding. 5 Stan. L. Rev. 6S0 (1953); Dayldn, Fcathert edin7, 7 Lab.
L.J. 699 (1956); Van de Water, Industrial Productivity and the Law: A Study of Work
Restrictions, 43 Va. L. Rev. 155 (1957). It would appear likely that little prorc3: can
be made in this respect until some effective means of assisting employces dicplaccd by
technological advance is developed. A search for an alternative to make-work practices
comparable to the search for an alternative to import restrictions as a form of protcctioni m
in foreign trade is thus necessary. If limitations bascd upon the caume of injury are not
imposed, many of the same approaches could help in providing an alternative to both
forms of protection, such as vocational retraining. See gecrally Cox, The U se and
Abuses of Union Power, 35 Notre Dame Law. 624, 636 (1960); Fanning, The Chal-
lenge of Automation in the Light of the Natural Law, 11 Lab. LJ. G75, $31
(1960); R. A. Givens, Dealing With National Emergency Labor DLputes, 34 Temp.
L. Q. 17, 3-40 (1960). In the case of technological displacement, how,.ver, the con-
cept of "compensation" may be more appropriate than in the case of injury due to
trade liberalization, since (a) the injured parties are more readily idcntifiable, and (b)
the industry involved directly benefits from the change and hence can be rcwimably
asked to pay for some of its consequences. An approach to the problem along these
lines has been suggested by Professor William Gomberg of the Univer"ty of Pcnn-
syIvania in a report for a Commerce Department study of federal transportation
policy. The suggested approach would view job opportunities as at lca-st in some re:p:cts
analogous to property rights (compare Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement
(1928); Porter, Job Property Rights (1954)) but would permit a "taking" of thi prop-
erty in return or just compensation as under eminent domain. See Gombcr ', The Work
Rules and Work Practices Problem, 12 Lab. L. J. 643 (1961); Koaoris, Worling Rules in
West Coast Longshoring, 84 Monthly Labor Review 1 (1961); N.Y. Times, April 11, 190,
p. 18, coL 1; cf. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1960, p. 62, col. 1. A beginning has been made
in this direction by unemployment compensation and by regulatory agencies bing
empowered to condition approval of changes in service eliminating jobs upon appropriate
measures to relieve employee distress. See ICC v. Railway Labor Executive .Asn.,
315 U.S. 373 (1942). This is true, even though the employees' jobs need not be retained
if they are compensated. See Maintenance of Way Employces v. United StatQ, 365 U.S.
S01 (1961).
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the alternatives to protection considered here can make a contribution
to this end, broader policies to deal with inflation and deflation in the
economy as a whole form the indispensable foundation for the measures
discussed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Protection against foreign competition as a way of dealing with injury
to domestic industry has come into direct collision with the urgent needs
of our foreign policy. Great politcal courage is therefore required, to
overcome the pressures which naturally tend to cause a drift toward
protectionism, including trade barriers in many guises. Protectionism
can be lessened with effectiveness and with fairness to those who face
possible injury only if workable alternatives are available.
As ably pointed out by Clair Wilcox, there are serious objections to
any program limited to aid to the victims of reductions of trade barriers
alone. It is therefore essential to search for a substitute for protection
as a way of dealing with economic dislocation regardless of its specific
cause; we must seek a program which will provide an alternative to
"protectionism" in its broadest sense by assisting producers, workers,
communities, and entire industries to participate to the fullest extent
in an expanding economy.
We have many traditional methods available for these ends if we
are willing to adapt them to changing conditions. These include tech-
nical advice and credit assistance for producers, retraining opportunities
and unemployment compensation for workers, financial aid and tech-
nical advice for depressed communities, and measures to aid entire
industries such as research, stockpiling, use of government contracts, and
transition periods in the effectiveness of trade liberalization. Together
with use of these methods must go a determination to launch a self-re-
inforcing abandonment of protection in all its forms, and to replace it
with measures designed to limit economic injury by promoting the
fullest use of our resources. These issues are initially economic issues,
but they have deep moral implications, and our ultimate resolution of
them will not depend upon economic theories alone, but upon our far-
sightedness, generosity, and courage.
